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Investment in network infrastructure can boost long-term economic growth in OECD 
countries. Moreover, infrastructure investment can have a positive effect on growth that goes 
beyond the effect of the capital stock because of economies of scale, the existence of network 
externalities competition enhancing effects. This paper analyses the empirical relationship 
between infrastructure and economic growth. Time-series results reveal a positive impact of 
infrastructure investment on growth. They also show that this effect varies across countries 
and sectors and over time. In some cases, these results reveal evidence of possible over-
investment. Bayesian model averaging of cross-section growth regressions confirms that 
infrastructure investment in telecommunications and the electricity sectors has a robust 
positive effect on long-term growth (but not in railways and road networks). Furthermore, this 
effect is highly nonlinear as the impact is stronger if the physical stock is lower. 
JEL Code: E22, O11, O40. 
Keywords: investment, infrastructure, network industry, economic growth, cointegration, 




















The authors are indebted to Jørgen Elmeskov, Giuseppe Nicoletti, Jean-Luc Schneider, Fabio 
Schiantarelli and participants of an OECD internal seminar for useful comments, as well as 
Irene Sinha for editorial assistance. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the 
author and are not necessarily shared by the OECD.   2 
1.  Introduction 
A wide debate on the influence of infrastructure on output levels and growth has led to attempts to 
quantify this effect and to ask about optimal levels of investment in infrastructure, particularly over 
the past two decades. While there is a wide consensus that some basic level of infrastructure is 
necessary  for  development,  the  ranges  of  estimates  of  the  effects  of  infrastructure  have  varied 
widely.  
Infrastructure  has  often  been  seen  as  increasing  productivity  and  attracting  business  activity  by 
lowering transport and production costs and facilitating market access. Some of these effects cancel 
out on the aggregate level, given that infrastructure has to be paid for. However, even in the absence 
of the “free input” effect, the effects of infrastructure on output on the aggregate level may still differ 
from the effects of total capital for a number of reasons. First, there may be significant economies of 
scale  that  differ  from  other  investments.  Second,  network  externalities  may  characterise 
infrastructure investments, through connecting both regions and countries. Third, infrastructure may 
have a competition enhancing effect, allowing for improved market access, such as through lowering 
transport costs.  However, the  causal link  between infrastructure  and  growth may  operate  in  the 
opposite  direction,  as  countries  with  high  levels  of  output  will  also  be  able  to  fund  higher 
infrastructure  investments,  which  may  be  desirable  for  social  reasons.  Moreover  infrastructure 
investment will, to some extent, reflect expectations of future capacity utilization.   
The focus in this paper is on physical capital stocks in network sectors: transport (roads, motorways 
and railways) and non-transport (electricity, telecommunications). All these sectors can be expected 
to  have  network  externalities  and  large  economies  of  scale.  Their  expansion  can  be  fostering 
competition in other segments by facilitating market access through lowering the costs of transport 
and communication. 
After briefly reviewing previous research, this paper applies a simple exogenous growth model to 
capture the effect of physical infrastructure levels on GDP per capita in an annual panel of OECD 
countries since the 1960s. The data are then described and the estimations reported. This is followed 
by the estimation of cross-section growth regressions for multi-annual periods. This part of the paper 
describes the main methods of model selection, before presenting results for linear and non-linear 
models.  
The main conclusions are as follows. First, regarding measures of infrastructure, data quality limits 
the  scope  of  the  empirical  work.  National  account  data  for  investment  or  capital  stocks  in 
infrastructure sectors are available in long series for only a handful of countries and still contain    
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methodological differences. Measures of infrastructure quality are even more scarce and of poorer 
comparability. Overall, the most robust available measures of infrastructure for a sample of OECD 
countries over time are physical indicators. It should be noted that much of the literature seems to 
confuse infrastructure with public capital stocks or public investment, which, due to corporatisation, 
privatisation and market liberalisation are increasingly unreliable measures of infrastructure. 
Regarding annual time-series growth regressions, we find that the contributions of infrastructure to 
long-run output levels and growth are not homogenous across countries. Results indicate that the 
expansion  of  infrastructure  could  be  both  more  or  less  productive  with  respect  to  other  capital 
expenditure. Furthermore, the result that more does not always mean better (in terms of GDP per 
capita) seems to be robust across different specifications including control variables such as human 
capital, trade openness and tax revenues. Finally, the validity of the full sample estimates holds for 
more recent years, and in most countries the effect does not seem to change.  
For multi-annual cross-section growth regressions, the evidence based on Bayesian averaging of 
classical estimates suggests greater provision of broad measures of infrastructure is associated with 
higher subsequent growth rates. The results also suggest that the link is non-linear, with a potentially 
higher impact of additional infrastructure in countries with initially lower levels of provision.  
2.  Previous research 
In much of the literature, especially aggregate-level studies, public capital is often regarded as a 
synonym for (public) infrastructure.
1 Therefore, the effects of public investment (general government 
gross fixed capital formation in Sturm et al. 1999) or estimates of public capital (Kamps, 2005), are 
often  assumed  to  be  the  effects  of infrastructure  on  growth  or  output  levels.  However,  this 
assumption is increasingly problematic. First, due to corporatisation and the privatisation of firms in 
network industries in many of the OECD countries, together with a liberalisation of entry into these 
sectors, much of the physical capital and investments are no longer classified as government. In 
sectors such as telecommunications, electricity or rail, most entities are not included in the definition 
of general government.
2 Furthermore, a growing share of government fixed capital formation will 
often include investment in schools, hospitals and government buildings.  
                                                       
1.  Romp and De Haan (2007) survey the effect of public investment and infrastructure on growth.  
2.  In  national  accounts  (SNA93/ESA55),  general  government  excludes  state-owned  corporations,  quasi-
corporations and public utility firms.   4 
In the economic literature, a number of channels through which infrastructure can affect aggregate 
GDP  levels  and  growth  have  been  identified.  A  standard  approach, following  Aschauer  (1989), 
incorporates infrastructure into the production function as a third input with capital and labour.
3 
Infrastructure is treated separately, due to those features that distinguish it as an input and most of 
the specifications allow the use of physical stocks. Alternatively, infrastructure can be treated as a 
total factor productivity augmenting input: by lowering the costs of production ( e.g. through the 
costs of transport and communication) it increases the technological index.
4  
From the empirical point of view, two mainstream approaches can be distinguished. First, a large 
number  of  papers  a dopt  variations  of  a  production  function  approach  and  estimate  either  a 
simultaneous equation model with a production and an investment function or a closed-form solution 
to a growth model most commonly based on a Cobb -Douglas or trans-log production function. 
Examples include: 
  Cross-country: Calderon and Severn (2002) estimate the effect of various types of 
physical infrastructure on growth and inequality for over 100 countries
5 or Esfahani and 
Ramirez (2002) who develop and estimate a structural model of  infrastructure and growth 
for 75 countries.
6  
  National: for both one country or for a group or panel of countries, see for instance 
Ford and Poret (1991), for a study on OECD countries,
7 
  Regional:  La Ferrara and Marcellino (2000) study the effect of infrastructure on 
productivity  in  Italian  regions
8  while Stephan (2000) attempts to assess the effect of 
transportation infrastructure stock in French and German regions.  
                                                       
3.  Aschauer‟s (1989) results sparked a discussion on the effects of public capital on output and productivity. 
His results, showing that the productivity of public investment can be much higher than that of private 
investment, caused strong controversy (being criticised from many methodological points of view, ranging 
from inappropriate estimation techniques to the specific characteristics of the period analysed). 
4.  Sturm  et  al.  (1998)  showed  that  an  estimated  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  cannot  distinguish 
between these two specifications. 
5.  The authors focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and experiment with both quantity and quality variables for 
infrastructure (electricity, road and telecommunications). They include a number of control variables in 
their equation to account for education, trade, financial development, institutional quality etc. Using the 
system GMM of Arellano and Bover (1995) they find strong positive effects of infrastructure on growth. 
6.  The authors find benefits from infrastructure investment and performance in infrastructure sectors but show 
that achieving better outcomes (in terms of growth) requires institutional and organisational improvements. 
7.  The study of 11 OECD economies uses two alternative definitions of public capital, of which the “broad” 
definition includes structures in transport, communications and electricity to test its influence on total 
factor productivity. The results show mixed experiences for OECD countries.    
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   Industry: Shanks and Barnes (2008) estimate the effect of road and communications 
infrastructure on industry-level multi-factor productivity growth for Australia.  
The alternative mainstream approach is estimating a cost-function approach based on the idea that 
firms optimise by maximising profits given a price of output and a cost function which includes 
infrastructure as one of the inputs. From a firm level this input is often assumed as fixed, externally 
given (i.e. exogenous) and “free”, but a firm decides on the amount of input it uses resulting in an 
aggregate  demand  for  infrastructure –  thus  determining  an  environment  in  which  it  operates. 
Infrastructure is assumed to have a cost-reducing effect for firms. The cost-function approach can 
also be adopted at various levels of aggregation:  
  National  and  cross-country:  Demetriades  and  Mamuneas (2000)  generally  find 
positive  effects  of  public  capital  on  output  supply  and  input  demand  for  12 OECD 
countries.
9  
  Regional: La Ferrara and Marcellino (2000) who tend to find signs of overinvestment 
in Central Italy.  
  Industry:  Moreno  et  al.  (2003)  find  wide  heterogeneity  of  the  cost  elasticity  of 
infrastructure capital across industries and regions of Spain for the 1980s.  
One  strand  of  the  empirical  literature  attempts  to  tackle  the  issue  of  geographical  network 
externalities. For example, Fernald (1999) finds high productivity of additional roads in the United 
States until the interstate highway system was completed, but cannot reject the effect being different 
from zero once the network was broadly completed. This allows benefits from the abundance of 
infrastructure in neighbouring regions or countries, or where firm suffer from the fact that others use 
infrastructure.  
Finally, a pool of studies uses so-called vector auto-regressions or vector error-correction models 
(VAR and VECM, respectively). These are somewhat similar to a production function approach, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8.  Among the approaches taken by the authors is the estimation of a production function approach where 
public  capital,  acting  as  a  proxy  for  infrastructure,  has  a  productivity  augmenting  effect  on  output 
(measured  by  regional  value-added  in  the  manufacturing  sector).  They  find  mixed  effects  across  four 
Italian macro-regions though note that the use of a common perpetual inventory method to construct the 
public capital variable may drive part of the effect as different regions may differ in the efficiency of 
spending the money devoted to investment. 
 
9.  The results obtained using the inter-temporal optimisation framework for the manufacturing sectors of the 
12 OECD countries point to a general under-supply of public infrastructure in the countries, though large 
heterogeneity can be observed, both across time and countries.   6 
using the same variables, but allow more flexibility in modelling the cross-relationships between the 
variables. For example, Flores de Frutos et al. (1998), find permanent effects of shocks to public 
infrastructure on output, employment, private and public capital in Spain. However, most of these 
models suffer from the problem of short series, tend to run out of degrees of freedom quickly and the 
assumptions  necessary  to  identify  shocks  are  often  unconvincing.  On  the  positive  side,  these 
approaches are better able to deal dealing with reverse causality, which is one of the main problems 
of estimating the effect of infrastructure on growth. 
The problem of causality 
1.  In general, causality is difficult to establish convincingly in growth regressions. In principle, 
the saving rate is exogenous in the benchmark Solow model, implying that the effect of any type of 
investment (be it in total capital, infrastructure or human capital) on growth should be unidirectional. 
In practice, however, this assumption is too restrictive as the saving rate may be influenced by the 
growth rate. In empirical settings, a number of approaches have been used to address the problem of 
causality:  
  Instrumental variables: The first notable attempt in this setting was by Aschauer 
(1989) who used lagged investment as an instrument, which is questionable. Finding a 
convincing instrument that is correlated with infrastructure variables but not with output has 
proved extremely difficult.  
  Granger causality: Another approach is to test for Granger causality. However this 
approach requires either the estimation of a multivariate system which would require a long 
data set or restricting to bi-variate causality tests where the omitted variables would pose a 
problem for the estimated coefficients. In general, Granger causality must be used with 
caution,  as  it  does  not  reflect  the  pure  concept  of  causality,  rather  the  usefulness  for 
predictions, and despite finding a variable Granger-causes another the variables may be 
driven by a third process.
10 
                                                       
10.  Simple bivariate Granger causality tests were conducted on the stationary first differences of per capita 
GDP and infrastructure variables, both in single series and in a panel setting. With 4 lags, the tests lack 
power,  and  can  only  reject  the  lack  of  Granger  causality  (in  both  directions)  for  energy  and 
telecommunications  in  a  panel  setting.  The  panel  setting  imposes  common  cross  country  coefficients, 
which as will be shown later is not necessarily correct. The single series tests do not provide strong results 
rejecting (at 10%) the lack of Granger causality from infrastructure to GDP for only a handful of countries, 
mostly  in  the  case  of  electricity  and  motorways  (the  results  are  reported  in  the  Appendix  Tables A.5 
and A.6).    
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  Simultaneous equations: Other approaches propose simultaneous equation estimation 
derived from simple structural models. These in turn require assumptions on the channels 
through  which  output  influences  infrastructure  investments  (see  Esfahani  and  Ramirez 
2003)  in  particular  on  the  political  decision-making  process  of  public  investment  (e.g. 
Cadot et al. 1999, 2006). 
  Impulse response functions:  Another way of going about causality, applied using 
public capital estimates are impulse response functions, as in Kamps (2005). They require 
estimation of a VAR system with all the variables in the model, together with their lags and 
tend to quickly run out of degrees of freedom. Thus with relatively short time series the 
standard  errors  are  likely  to  be  large,  which  is  most  probably  why  the  author  of  the 
aforementioned paper reports 68% confidence intervals, while not accounting for the large 
uncertainty regarding the construction of one of the independent variables (public capital 
stock) and still fails to find much significant effects.  
  Using stocks rather than flows: Other authors (see Arnold et al. 2007) argue that the 
use  of  stocks  (usually  human  capital)  instead  of  flows  reduces  the  problem  of  reverse 
causality. The reasoning is based on the fact that the feedback from output to stocks, which 
contain an accumulated investment over many years, will be smaller than in the case of 
investment. Although the argument should  in principle apply to infrastructure (physical 
capital  which is  generally  composed  of  assets  with  a  relatively  long  life  span), it only 
reduces the problem and does not eliminate it convincingly enough to disregard the issue of 
causality in long-run relationships.  
  Assuming it away: Canning and Bennathan (2000) argue that the use of panel data 
sets rids of the issue of causality if one assumes a common long run production function 
relationship across countries while allowing for heterogeneous investment relationships and 
pools the data across countries. 
  Exploiting  co-integrating  relations:  Finally,  Canning  and  Pedroni  (2008)  have 
attempted to tackle the issue by estimating small country-specific error-correction models 
for GDP per capita and infrastructure per capita. However, the co-integrating relationship 
between the two variables is underpinned by strong assumptions, such as the instantaneous 
depreciation  of  infrastructure,  in  order  to  overcome  the  issue  of  omitted  variables  and 
reduce the problem to two variables. Other details of the specification, such as conceptual 
problems of being, on average, above or below an estimated equilibrium, or the possibility   8 
of the inversion of the results towards the end of the sample show that the problems with 
establishing causality persist.  
As causality is not convincingly established in any of these approaches in simple aggregate growth 
regressions, it is often dealt with at industry or company level where one can more easily assume that 
infrastructure is exogenous, or in cross section regressions such as those reported in Section 6. 
3.  Basic Model 
The model underlying the empirical estimations is based on a simple exogenous growth framework 
proposed by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), MRW hereafter. The model is based on a human 
capital augmented production function where human capital is treated as an „additional‟ factor of 
production to capital, population and technology: 
      
1 )) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t L t A t H t K t Y                               (1) 
where: Y, K, H, A and L represent GDP; total capital; human capital; the level of technology and the 
labour force, respectively.  With  1      the production function   exhibits decreasing 
returns  to  all  capital.  Capital  accumulation  functions  (where  lower  cases  indicate variables  per 
effective unit of labour e.g. y=Y/AL) are given by: 
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This is the basis for the approach taken in this paper, where as a first step infrastructure stock (inf) is 
assumed to be a factor of production. Appropriately, an equivalent equation can be derived: 
                                                       
11.  This is equation 12 in the MRW paper, which uses the saving rate and stock of human capital. A second 
version of the basic model includes the savings rates into both types of capital. As data on investment into 
capital stock in infrastructure sectors is practically unavailable for a broad set of OECD countries and for a 
long  time  series,  and  the  comparability  of  the  available  series  is  poor,  this  paper  focuses  on  the 
specification with one of the variables taken as stock. By construction the estimated coefficients differ 
slightly but in principle not in sign or significance.    
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This equation is then used to estimate th e long run levels relationship, with human capital also an 
important control variable.
12  
One of the primary aims of this exercise is to single out infrastructure as a separate, additional factor 
of production, as has been done with human capital in MRW. Ho wever, a difference relative to 
human capital is that infrastructure capital is generally included in measures of total capital stock. 
However, there are reasons to believe that the effect of infrastructure capital can be different than 
that of an average unit of capital. For example, the infrastructure stock often exhibits features of a 
natural monopoly, tends to have public good characteristics, network effects and spillovers into other 
sectors. Furthermore, investments are often large and their life-cycle long and will differ in terms of 
financing (private versus public). In this context, when physical infrastructure is included together 
with total capital stock or total capital investment the coefficient can be crudely interpreted as the 
additional effect of infrastructure, which is the different effect on GDP relative to other types of 
capital.  
Interpreting the additional effect of infrastructure is difficult. If both stocks were measured using the 
same units the increase in capital would include a prop ortional increase in physical infrastructure 
stock and the total effect would be α+ β.  Since the equation is estimated with infrastructure stocks 
measured in physical units, this is only a crude approximation of the effect. In this light, direct 
comparison is problematic, especially in the specification using investment rates, as the coefficients 
are  only  proportional  to  α  and  β  and  with  relatively  wide  estimated  confidence  intervals. 
Nevertheless, the sign and significance of the coefficient on infrastructure can be interpreted as an 
indication  of  the  additional  effect  that  investment  in  infrastructure  would  have –  a  positive 
significant coefficient may indicate that expanding infrastructure would be associated with higher 
output while a negative one may indicate inappropriate investment – in which case investment in 
other types of capital may be more productive. 
The framework is an exogenous growth model, and hence by construction an effect of infrastructure 
on long-run GDP levels and on short run GDP growth can exist, while the long-run growth rates at 
the steady state are exogenously determined by technological progress.
13 Moreover, the effect of 
                                                       
12 .  Equation 3 could also be derived to include the level of human capital, though the notation becomes more 
cumbersome. 
13  This may not hold in all circumstances (see Bond et al. 2004). For instance, Kocherlakota and Yi (1997) 
propose an interesting approach to testing growth exogeneity versus endogeneity by including (lags of) 
public investment together with tax revenues on the right hand side of the equation and testing for joint   10 
infrastructure on GDP levels and short run growth cannot be assessed by looking solely at the long-
run coefficient. In order for an equilibrium correction mechanism to exist (and thus to justify the 
two-step approach) the short-run coefficient on the ECM should be negative. 
4.  Data  
One limitation of the exercise is that the quality of the data is poor. National Accounts data on 
investment or capital stock volumes in specific sectors are available only for a handful of OECD 
countries,  and  usually  for  only  a  very  short  time  and  of  uncertain  comparability.  For  example, 
infrastructure capital stock estimates rely on assumptions about depreciation and scrapping rates, 
which are often poorly observed. Physical measures are available for a wider coverage of countries 
and for much longer time periods. However, physical capital stocks have a number of shortcomings. 
Most of the available data do not contain any information on differences in cost and quality. For 
example, the costs of setting up the infrastructure can vary markedly (an additional kilometre of road 
or  rail  track  would  be  more  expensive  if  requiring  a  bridge  or  a  tunnel),  while  the  quality  of 
infrastructure may also vary (well maintained stocks may yield more benefits than poorly maintained 
ones). Additionally, even the physical capital stock data encounters the problem of the lack of a 
uniform  methodology across  countries. To the extent that this does not change across time, the 
problem would be overcome by the inclusion of country-specific fixed effects in the regression. 
The variables are in natural logarithms, and the broadest approach is based on the year sample 1960-
2005  for  24  OECD  countries  (the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Germany  and 
Luxembourg are excluded due to problems with the data). In practice, the panel is unbalanced (with 
a  minimum  of  16  observations  per  country)  and  the  inclusion  of  countries  into  the  individual 
specifications is determined by the availability of the individual variables.  
In general, the infrastructure variables used in the model are in total physical stocks per capita (in 
line with the basic model specification), i.e. roads, motorways and railtracks are in kilometres of 
length per capita, electricity is defined as total plant generating capacity and telephone mainlines as 
number of fixed lines (both per capita). At first glance some types of infrastructure may make sense 
when measured in terms of density (for example, the length of roads infrastructure may seem more 
meaningful with respect to land area in some cases). However, as the estimation uses fixed effects, 
this is no different from including the raw level of infrastructure (dividing by land area is equivalent 
to dividing by any other constant). These values are used as an additional robustness check. In the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
coefficient significance. While tax revenues seem a potentially attractive counterpart to public investment, 
finding an equivalent variable for infrastructure is problematic.    
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case of telephone mainlines, the series exhibit fast growth in the first 30-40 years of the sample with 
a sharp slowdown and even fall in most countries in the last decade. This is probably related to 
technological change, such as the introduction of mobile phones and lines with greater bandwidth. In 
order to try to account for this we included the variable of total (mobile and fixed line) subscribers. 
However, this is not a pure infrastructure variable, and a rise in this variable could actually reflect an 
increase in use (possibly leading to congestion) rather than an increase in actual infrastructure.  
The dependent variable is measured as GDP per capita (of 15-64 population) in 2000 PPP terms. The 
other variables include saving or actually investment rate (measured using total gross fixed capital 
formation relative to GDP), private gross fixed capital formation relative to GDP, total physical 
capital stock to GDP, human capital measured as the average number of years of schooling for the 
adult population, general government tax revenue relative to GDP and trade openness as imports plus 
exports relative to GDP. 
Time-series properties 
The time series properties of the variables were examined. The results for both single series and 
panel unit root test were: 
  In the single series tests, the null hypothesis that they contain a unit root cannot be 
rejected  for  the  majority  of  the  series,  both  when  including  and  when  not  including  a 
deterministic trend (see Appendix Table A.1 for excerpts of the results). The hypothesis that 
their first differences are non-stationary can be rejected, implying that most of the series 
(with  or  without  a  deterministic  trend)  are  I(1).  Some  of  the  results  suggest  that 
infrastructure variables could be regarded as I(0).  
  A set of panel unit root tests were run using the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test which 
imposes the fairly strong assumption of a common unit root process across the series and 
the  Im,  Pesaran  and  Shin  (2003)  test  which  relaxes  this  restriction. The latter  must  be 
treated with caution, as the null hypothesis is formulated as all series contain a unit root 
while the alternative hypothesis is that there is a non-zero share of stationary series in the 
panel. Thus, if the panel includes both stationary and non-stationary series the test will tend 
to  reject the  null.
14  Among the tested series this may be the case for GDP per capit a, 
                                                       
14.  For instance, when testing for a unit root in GDP per capita levels the null for a panel of all countries can 
be rejected, but if any two of the three countries which seemed to have stationary series according to the 
ADF single series tests are excluded, the null can no longer be rejected even at 90% confidence levels. In 
case of the investment rate to GDP the situation is similar, therefore for these two variables the ADF tests 
on single (country) series are reported in the Appendix, showing that for most countries the assumption that   12 
investment rates or some of the infrastructure series for which the evidence in single series 
test was mixed.
15 An excerpt of the results is presented in Appendix Table A.2.  
Clearly the comparatively small sample of OECD countries limits the strength of  the conclusions.
16 
However, one can fairly confidently assume that log GDP is an integrated variable when looking at 
results from wider panels used in other studies (Canning, 1999; Canning and Pedroni, 2008). 
The next step involves testing for cointegration in the various specifications (reported in Appendix 
Table A.3). For the majority of proposed specifications in levels which represent long-run equations, 
the null hypothesis  of  no  cointegration can  be  rejected, regardless  of  whether  we  assume  a 
homogenous panel (as in Kao, 1999) or a heterogenous panel (as in Pedroni, 1999). The inclusion of 
a deterministic trend, along the line of the MRW model, further improves the rejection rates in 
heterogenous panels.  
5.  Annual time-series estimations 
The time-series properties of the data determine the empirical estimation approach. Despite some of 
the  relevant  tests  being  inconclusive,  one  cannot  exclude  the  possibility  of  there  being  a  co-
integrating relationship among variables which contain a unit root. As a result, the estimation uses 
the so-called two-step Engle-Granger (1987) approach in a heterogeneous panel setting to address 
this possibility. In this approach, the long run levels equation is estimated, first, as follows:
17 
t b n b b s b b y i it i it i
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The estimation is done using Dynamic OLS, which has favourable asymptotic and finite -sample 
properties (see Stock and Watson, 1993 or Mark and Sul, 2003) in estimating a long run relationship. 
Dynamic OLS includes lags and leads (in this case 2 and 1 respectively, due to the relatively short 
time span of the sample) and contemporaneous values of the first differenced variables in order to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
variables  are  integrated  of  order  one  is  reasonable.  Both  panel  and  single  series  tests  point  to  the 
stationarity of the series of motorways per capita however. 
15.  In principle the possibility that some of the variables are indeed stationary will not invalidate the results, as 
the methodology used allows for the presence of such variables. However, if the case was reversed, i.e. 
stationarity was wrongfully assumed and the possibility of unit roots ignored during the estimation, one 
would encounter problems of spurious correlations and invalid inference. 
16.  The single series tests are troubled by the problem of low power in a relatively short sample. 
17.  In the panel setup, due to the fact that the yearly population growth rate can be negative, the levels value 
has been used instead of the logarithm, thus the coefficient should be interpreted as a semi-elasticity. In the 
original cross-section setting of MRW the population growth rate is a non-negative multi-year average, 
thus poses no such problem.    
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yield asymptotically efficient estimates of the coefficients. The residuals from the first step are then 
plugged into the short run first difference equation with a lag of one period:   
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where the lag structure is determined by the data using the AIC criterion.  This  second  step  is 
estimated using OLS (due to the fact that it should contain only stationary variables). 
The main focus of the paper is on the long run coefficients, though certain properties of the short run 
cannot be ignored, e.g. the negative coefficient on the ECM term which will guarantee reversion to 
the equilibrium relationship. Most generally, the model is estimated for a heterogenous panel, with 
country-specific coefficients and for a homogenous panel with common coefficients for all countries. 
The intermediate approach has also been explored – applying the Pooled Mean Group estimator 
where the long run coefficients are homogenous (i.e. common across countries) while the short-run 
dynamics are not restricted to be the same across countries. However, coefficient homogeneity tests 
(both Wald Chi-squared and Hausman‟s tests) strongly reject the null of coefficient homogeneity.
18 
This indicates large individual coefficient heterogeneity and in the case of the PMG estimator, this 
points  to  the  inconsistency  of  the  pooled  estimates.  Therefore,  for  the  estimations  the  mean-
coefficients for every variable (which are the averages of the individual coefficients and not the 
pooled mean group coefficients) and the individual coefficients for the infrastructure variable have 
been reported.  
The basic regression formulation used for interpretation includes the total economy investment rate, 
physical infrastructure stocks per capita, population growth and a deterministic trend. As a first 
robustness check, the regressions are run using total capital stock instead of the investment rate. 
While the coefficient sizes can be affected (due to different derivation of the model) the signs should 
not be affected if the relationship is robust. Additionally private investment is used, and control 
variables are inserted one by one. The estimations use each infrastructure stock variable separately. 
The inclusion of the physical stock variables one-by-one (instead of all at a time) is determined by 
the amount of data available. This raises the possibility of an omitted variable bias. However, the 
coefficients on the other variables seem relatively robust to this approach and the inclusion of too 
many infrastructure variables causes the errors to increase dramatically due to multicollinearity.  
                                                       
18.  In the Wald Chi-squared test for the equality of coefficients across countries is rejected for all the types of 
infrastructure at 99% confidence levels.   14 
One  of  the  common  problems  of  growth  regressions  is  the  abundance  of  potential  explanatory 
variables (Temple, 2000, see also Section 6). There may be many factors explaining growth and the 
available data does not allow the inclusion of all of them in one specification. Furthermore, including 
even a sub-set may be undesirable due to the fact that many variables are likely to be collinear. In a 
simple attempt to extend the basic specification, the robustness of the results is checked by including, 
one-by-one, potential additional explanatory variables: first of all human capital (proxied by average 
years of schooling of the working age population) which is one of the standard explanatory variables. 
Next, the level of tax burdens (proxied by tax receipts to GDP) and trade openness (proxied by the 
sum of imports and export relative to GDP) are added. As a further robustness check, an additional 
set of estimations was run using private investment instead of total investment, as there is likely to be 
less  of  a  problem  of  double  counting  infrastructure  in  the  investment  measure.  However,  as 
infrastructure  investment  throughout  our  sample  may  have  been  increasingly  done  by  private 
companies, as a consequence of corporatisation, privatisation and the liberalisation of entry, the 
results have to be treated with caution. 
The lack of comparable cross-country series is a serious limitation to this type of analysis. First, 
while physical stocks have advantages over estimates of capital stock and investment series, they 
nonetheless fail to account for quality and are a crude measure of the abundance of infrastructure. 
Second, as usual in the simple growth regression approaches, causality can work both ways, partly to 
the extent that infrastructure investments reflect expectations of future growth and higher output 
levels. Therefore, the results need to be considered with some caution. 
5.1.  Results 
The  results  for  the  general  specification  are  presented  in  Tables 1  and 2,  while  the  robustness 
analysis follows. The estimated mean group coefficients on investment are significant and in line 
with  the  estimated  effects  of  capital  obtained  by  MRW  and  subsequent  studies.  The  estimated 
coefficients on investment range from 0.39 to 0.53 in the specifications without human capital and 
are smaller when human capital is included ranging from 0.3 to 0.42, which is similar to the MRW 
finding.
19  The coefficient on population growth is not directly comparable with MRW but is 
similarly  insignificant.  The  time  trend,  which  accounts  mainly  for  technological  prog ress  is 
significantly positive, but becomes insignificant once human capital is included. Human capital is 
usually not significant, contrary to many previous findings, but is significant when using different 
                                                       
19.  These estimated coefficients reflect α /(1- α) from equation (3) and can be used to obtain output elasticities 
with respect to capital α which are in the range of 0.28-0.35 with human capital excluded and 0.23 to 0.30 
when it is included.    
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estimation techniques.
20 As mentioned the mean gr oup coefficient on infrastructure capital, is in 
most cases not significant (with the exception of electricity generating capacity, where the estimated 
mean group coefficient is 0.17, significant at 95%).
21 
                                                       
20.  For  illustrative  purposes,  Appendix  Table A.6  reports  estimation  results  for  a  long-run  panel  with  a 
homogenous coefficient assumption, where indeed the coefficient on human capital tends to be significant 
more often, in line with previous estimates. Estimates obtained via Dynamic OLS tend to have wider 
confidence intervals than the Pooled Mean Group estimates and the use of mean group coefficients results 
in a further widening of the confidence intervals. Moreover, human capital to some extent may be collinear 
with the infrastructure variables as the variable resembles a deterministic trend in many countries, which 
causes problems with identification.  
21.  This may be in part due to the limited sample, which consists of a subset of OECD countries, all of which 
are relatively high-income countries and are relatively abundant in all the examined types of infrastructure. 
Moreover the limited time span of the sample plays a large role   16 
Table 1.  Time-series estimation results: transport infrastructure 
Investment 0.46 ** 0.3 * 0.53 *** 0.39 ** 0.42 *** 0.4 ***
Population growth 0.032 0.019 0.013 -0.007 0.019 -0.005
Human capital 0.18 0.08 -0.03
trend 0.02 *** -0.03 0.03 *** -0.08 0.02 *** -0.11
Australia 0.17 0.07 0.46 *** 0.50 ***
Austria -0.13 0.07 2.27 *** 1.04 *** 0.30 *** 0.17 ***
Belgium 0.27 0.12 -1.01 *** -0.39 ** 0.18 *** 0.12
Canada 0.45 3.02
Denmark 1.19 * -0.75 -0.20 *** -0.11 0.15 *** 0.10
Finland 1.66 -0.32 0.29 -0.48 0.01 0.00
France -0.81 *** -0.52 *** -2.52 *** 2.21 ** 0.14 *** 0.09
Greece -0.09 *** -0.09 ** 2.22 *** 0.93 ***
Iceland -1.45 ***
Ireland -2.29 *** 0.83 2.02 *** 0.03 0.00 0.00
Italy -0.28 *** -0.04 -0.94 *** -0.45 0.17 *** 0.06
Japan 0.64 1.43 2.46 *** 0.28 0.17 *** 0.13 ***
Korea 0.17 1.06 ***
Mexico 0.17 *
Netherlands -0.45 * -0.75 *** -0.15 -0.91 *** 0.12 ** 1.00 ***
New Zealand 1.85 *** 2.51 *** 0.95 *** 1.45 *** -0.34 *** 0.05
Norway 0.75 * 1.21 -1.37 * -0.13
Portugal 0.30 *** -0.04 0.09 -0.44 *** -0.16 *** 0.00
Spain -0.43 * -0.48 ** -1.28 *** -1.95 *** 0.17 *** 0.16 ***
Sweden -0.14 -0.35 -0.22 -0.21 0.23 *** 0.16
Switzerland -0.55 * -0.59 -3.65 ** 0.70 0.08 0.11
Turkey -0.13 -0.83
United Kingdom 0.92 ** 1.20 *** 0.30 ** 0.80 *** -0.02 -0.12
United States 1.86 2.00 -0.07 1.31 *** -0.10 -0.47
Error correction term (-1) -0.26 -0.39 -0.25 -0.53 * -0.4 -0.56
Adjusted R-squared long run 0.994 0.995 0.993 0.995 0.995 0.996
Adjusted R-squared short run 0.4 0.42 0.4 0.45 0.46 0.47
F-test 5.18 4.34 5.38 5.5 5.67 5.96
Durbin Watson statistic 1.47 1.68 1.55 1.74 1.75 1.82
Number of observations 849 615 845 666 600 529
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Long run (mean group)
Country specific coefficients for infrastructure




Note: The top panel gives the mean-group coefficients for the long run as well as the country-specific long-run coefficients for the electricity 
variable; the intermediate panel gives the coefficients for the short-run error correction term; the bottom panel gives regression diagnostics; ***, 
**, * denote the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively; heterogenous coefficients were used as the Wald test on homogenous 
coefficients was rejected for each regressor variable individually and for all regressors jointly. 
The coefficient of the infrastructure stock should be interpreted as the effect in addition to the effect of just adding to the productive capital stock. 
In this sense, a positive (negative) coefficient implies that the impact on output would be higher (lower). 
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Table 2.  Time series estimation results: non-transport infrastructure 
Investment 0.39 *** 0.39 *** 0.39 *** 0.42 *** 0.45 *** 0.34 **
Population growth 0.004 -0.006 0.021 0.003 0.024 0.009
Human capital 0.08 0.15 0.68
trend 0.02 *** -0.11 0.02 *** -0.13 0.02 *** -0.07
Australia -0.04 -0.23 ** -0.46 *** -0.43 *** 0.26 0.41 ***
Austria 0.40 *** 0.24 *** 0.39 *** 0.21 *** 0.71 *** 0.18
Belgium 0.54 *** 0.22 *** 0.37 ** -0.08 -0.70 *** -0.24 *
Canada 0.04 -0.08 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.56
Denmark 0.26 *** 0.36 ** 0.21 * -0.14 0.25 0.22
Finland 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 1.03 0.98
France 0.31 *** 0.15 ** 0.10 *** 0.01 -0.26 *** -0.11 *
Greece 0.31 *** 0.38 *** 0.32 *** 0.34 *** 0.16 *** 0.28 ***
Iceland 0.25 *** -0.60 *** 0.29 ***
Ireland -0.40 *** -0.40 *** -0.56 *** -0.19 -1.19 *** -0.05
Italy 1.15 *** 1.13 *** 0.42 *** 0.32 *** -0.14 *** -0.11
Japan 0.54 *** 0.40 ** 0.33 *** 0.12 -0.25 *** -0.13 ***
Korea -0.23 *** 0.02 0.03
Mexico 0.58 *** 0.68 *** 0.87 ***
Netherlands 0.25 *** 0.21 -0.12 * 0.00 -0.31 *** -0.75 ***
New Zealand -0.28 *** -0.29 ** -0.80 *** -1.06 *** 0.18 *** 0.11 ***
Norway 0.14 *** 0.34 0.10 0.13 ** -0.19 -0.34 *
Portugal 0.26 *** -0.04 0.31 *** 0.07 -0.30 *** -0.26 ***
Spain 0.35 *** 0.37 *** 0.19 0.64 *** -0.57 *** -0.75 ***
Sweden 0.03 -0.01 -0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.14
Switzerland 0.08 -0.16 0.13 -0.32 -0.04 0.03
Turkey 0.26 *** 0.08 0.28 **
United Kingdom 0.09 0.49 *** -0.21 *** -0.29 *** -0.39 *** 0.64 ***
United States -0.08 * -0.18 0.55 * 0.24 0.31 ** 0.47
Error correction term (-1) -0.24 -0.41 -0.24 -0.49 -0.35 -0.58
Adjusted R-squared long run 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.997 0.998
Adjusted R-squared short run 0.43 0.41 0.45 0.45 0.42 0.45
F-test 4.85 5.1 6.58 5.74 5.53 3.75
Durbin Watson statistic 1.55 1.69 1.63 1.7 1.5 1.64
Number of observations 961 700 958 697 912 669
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Long run (mean-group)
Country specific coefficients for infrastructure
Short run (mean group)
Electricity Telephone mainlines Telephone subscriptions
Coefficient Coefficient
 
Note: The top panel gives the mean-group coefficients for the long run as well as the country-specific long-run coefficients for the electricity 
variable; the intermediate panel gives the coefficients for the short-run error correction term; the bottom panel gives regression diagnostics; ***, 
**, * denote the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively; heterogenous coefficients were used as the Wald test on homogenous 
coefficients was rejected for each regressor variable individually and for all regressors jointly. 
The coefficient of the infrastructure stock should be interpreted as the effect in addition to the effect of just adding to the productive capital stock. 
In this sense, a positive (negative) coefficient implies that the impact on output would be higher (lower). 
 
While there does not appear to be a common effect of infrastructure on output and growth there are 
significant  country-specific  effects.  Figure 1  displays  the  coefficients  on  the  infrastructure  stock 
variable  for  each  sector  graphed  together  with  90%  confidence  intervals  (which  graphically 
demonstrates why the assumption of a homogenous effect was rejected). They are estimated for the   18 
whole sample using the basic specification, total capital investment and including a human capital 
stock variable. The different specifications used in the robustness check are presented in Figure 2. 
Shares of positive significant coefficients are presented above the axis, while shares of negative 
significant coefficients are presented below the axis.
22  
Figure 1.   Infrastructure coefficient estimates from growth regressions 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                       
22.  Due to different availability of variables for each country the shares are not calculated over the same 
amount of regressions. They are calculated over all available specifications, which vary from 20 to 48.    
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Figure 2.  Robustness check for time-series growth regressions 






































   20 
 
Road 
In case of the transport sector, a strong positive influence of length of roads per capita on GDP per 
capita levels and short term growth can be identified for the United Kingdom and New Zealand, 
being relatively robust. The alternative specifications show a possible similar effect for Australia and 
Portugal. If length of motorways is used, the effect is positive in Austria, Spain, Japan and the 
Netherlands. Interestingly, only in the first two is the effect robust to the inclusion of controls, while 
the effect for Belgium is generally positive, albeit not in the basic specification.  
A negative effect of roads can be seen for France, Greece, Spain and the Netherlands, of which the 
latter two, as mentioned had shown a positive effect of motorways. It can be noted that in none of the 
countries is a robust negative effect of motorways found, though the United Kingdom and Japan 
show some weak signs of potential overinvestment (assuming the relationship is non linear). In 
general  positive  estimates  for  the  coefficients  on  infrastructure  can  be  crudely  interpreted  as 
investment in kilometres of roads being more productive than other types of investment, as roads are 
already included in total capital. Therefore, the results suggest that throughout our sample in the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand an increase in road length was associated with higher output and 
growth than other capital investment while it was the contrary in Greece, France, Spain and the 
Netherlands, where other types of investment have shown to be more productive.  
In a number of countries the coefficients on roads tend to be negative or insignificant while the 
respective coefficients on motorways are positive. This may reflect the fact that the road networks 
were relatively well developed through most part of the sample, and additional roads were associated 
with  fewer  benefits  in  terms  of  output  levels  than  the  expansion  of  the  motorway  networks. 
Moreover, the objectives behind building roads may to a higher extent reflect social considerations 
rather than the large scale, fast transport routes, or international connections which are more often 
done via motorways. 
Rail track 
With  respect to rail tracks, positive significant effects on output levels and growth can be found in 
Australia,  Austria,  Ireland  (in  most  specifications),  Greece,  New  Zealand,  the  United  Kingdom, 
France,  and  the  United  States,  suggesting  that  in  these  countries  investment  in  rail  tracks  was 
associated with higher output levels. Only in the case of the first four this seems robust to different 
specifications. A negative significant effect is found in the Benelux countries, and on the Iberian 
Peninsula, which may indicate some type of over-investment. In a large number of specifications this    
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seems also true for Switzerland and Italy. It must be noted that in many OECD countries the length 
of rail tracks per capita was actually decreasing throughout the sample, thereby associated with an 
increase in output per capita in the two groups of countries. 
Electricity generation 
In case of electricity generating capacity, the effects are positive and significant in Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark,  Spain,  Greece,  United  Kingdom,  France,  Iceland,  Japan,  Mexico,  Turkey  and  the 
Netherlands, while being negative in Australia, Ireland and New Zealand. With the exception of 
Australia, these findings are robust, and the mean-group coefficient is positive and significant.  
Telecommunications 
The increase in telephone mainlines per capita was associated with higher output levels and growth 
in Austria, Spain, Greece, Italy, Norway, Mexico and Iceland. On the other hand, it was associated 
with a slowdown in growth and lower levels of output for Australia, United Kingdom, Ireland and 
New  Zealand,  where  the  relationship  is  very  robust.  However,  as  noted  above,  technological 
developments  may  obscure  the  relationship  between  telecommunications  infrastructure  and 
growth.
23A simple but rough way of accounting for this is to look at estimates for the variable of 
telephone subscribers (fixed and mobile), for which the effect turns p ositive for Australia, United 
Kingdom and New Zealand becoming insignificant for Ireland. 
As the estimates are drawn from a period which covers the 1960s till 2005, the negative or positive 
contributions of infrastructure stock to output levels and growth fail to give an indication of whether 
recent investment conforms to the experience over the longer period. In other words, an indication of 
overinvestment  (that  is  an  estimated  negative  contribution  around  the  deterministic  trend)  or 
underinvestment (a positive contribution) may be strongly driven by events in the early part of the 
sample. In order to account for this, at least partly, specifications allowing for non -linear effects at 
the end of the period have been estimated. This has been done in line wit h the robustness tests (i.e. 
across different specifications) with an additional inclusion of an interaction variable which is equal 
to the infrastructure stock in respectively the last 11, 7 and 5 years of the sample, and equal to zero 
before.
24 
                                                       
23.  For example, the negative correlation may be related to the increase in mainlines slowing and then falling 
while growth was accelerating. 
24.   Three  types  of  time  intervals  are  chosen  in  order  to  avoid  the  influence  of  cyclical  factors  on  the 
estimates – they encompass commonly assumed lengths of business cycle duration (i.e. 5 to 11 years).   22 
Table 3 shows that in case of most countries no significant separate effect at the end of the sample 
can be identified. However, in a number of countries the effect became stronger, suggesting for 
example that further increases in electricity generation capacity can be related to a decrease in output 
in Australia and Austria, similarly to motorways in Austria, New Zealand and Switzerland and rail 
tracks in Ireland and the Netherlands, whereas increases in road capacity may be associated with an 
increase in output in Greece, Ireland and the United Kingdom and additional electricity generation 
capacity in Portugal may support growth. 
Table 3.  End of sample effects of infrastructure variables 
positive negative
Roads p.c. - -
density GRC(0), IRL(0), GBR(0) NZL(-)
Motorways p.c. - AUT(+), NZL(0), CHE(0)
density - -
Rail p.c. - IRL(0), NLD(-)
density GRC(0) IRL(0)
Electricity p.c. PRT(0) AUS(-), AUT(+)
density PRT(0) AUS(-), AUT(+)
Telephone mainlines p.c. - AUT(+), ISL(0), IRL(0)
density IRL(-) -
Telephone subscribers p.c. - AUT(+), GRC(+)
density - AUT(+), GRC(+)  
Reported only if significant in more than two thirds of the specifications (different types of capital, different control variables, end of sample 11, 7 
and 5 years). – indicates that no countries met this criterion. 
The sign of the effect estimated over the entire sample is shown in brackets (0 if insignificant). 
 
Much of the empirical work focusing on a broader set of countries (see for example Canning and 
Bennathan, 2000, Canning and Pedroni, 1999) also fails to capture a common effect of infrastructure, 
even though dealing with a larger sample and inevitably more variation in GDP and infrastructure 
levels. Hulten (1996) fails to find any significant common effect of infrastructure stocks (telephone 
mainlines, rail, paved roads and electricity generation capacity) on growth in a cross-section study 
derived from the MRW approach. Nevertheless the results suggest that quality and efficiency of use 
may matter. Moreover, non-linear influences of infrastructure may also be at work – however, most 
of these effects can only be analysed at regional, industry or company level.    
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The negative estimated coefficients on infrastructure confirm that in the case of OECD countries 
more infrastructure is not always “better”.
25 The negative estimated coefficients may be signalling 
over-investment as increases in infrastructure are associated with lower increases in GDP.
26 Over-
investment in terms of quantity or perhaps high costs (admittedly not captured here directly) 
associated with poor investment decisions, with inadequate location or the high costs of expanding 
already developed networks can actually negatively influence GDP per capita levels. The finding is 
relatively robust to different specifications and underlines the importance of proper cost -benefit 
analysis of infrastructure investments as well as the importance of the fact that with limited resources 
infrastructure investments may not be the most productive. 
6.  Cross-country growth regressions 
The cross-country approach uses multi-year averages with a limited number of observations in the 
panel. This approach requires a different interpretation from the annual panel data approach: cross-
sectional data help explain why economic growth differs across countries over long periods of time. 
The same argument applies to the role of infrastructure investment. This  section explains cross-
country heterogeneity in economic growth that is attributable to differences in the level of physical 
infrastructure (rather than the effect due to the evolution of physical infrastructure within a given 
country).  
6.1  Variable selection and data issues 
The starting point of the analysis is to identify the set of explanatory variables that will be used in the 
growth regressions from the large number of possible drivers of economic growth.
27 In practice, very 
similar data to those used  in the annual panels are used in this analysis. Furthermore, the variables 
used are limited to those that are proven to be robust in previous research (Sala-i-Martin et al. 2004; 
Doppelhofer and Weeks, 2008). In some cases these variables are modified to capture differences 
                                                       
25.  In this context “better” is defined as higher GDP per capita and higher GDP growth. While this seems a 
straightforward measure of well being, there may be others as well. Fore example, social considerations for 
the building of infrastructure associated with universal service. 
26.  A negative coefficient can also signal indivisibility in investment and small increases in infrastructure do 
not tend to influence output positively, while a major investment may yield substantial network effects and 
push the economy into a new equilibrium. This issue is explored in a slightly different setting in Section 6. 
27.  The previous literature has used a large number of variables that can be excluded from the analysis of 
recent OECD performance, such as dummy variables capturing wars, political instability, the spread of 
malaria, Sub-Saharan Africa, colonial past or the main religion.   24 
across OECD countries (such as human capital and openness variables, see below)
28 and variables 
that are not available for large cross -sections of countries, but are available for OECD economies, 
are included, (such as the OECD indicators of product market regulation). The possible explanatory 
variables considered are: 
  Log initial GDP per capita level 
  Human capital measured in terms of educational achievements in the population over 
  15 years  
  The growth rate of investment prices (which is often used instead of investment rate 
  in cross-country growth regressions) 
  Government investment as a share of GDP 
  Life expectancy (at birth) 
  Openness measured in terms of goods and services relative to GDP 
  Growth rate of labour force 
  Growth rate of the consumer price index 
  The  degree  of  regulation  (measured  by  the  OECD  indicators  of  product  market 
  regulation) 
The measures of infrastructure include the physical measures used in the previous section (railtrack, 
motorways,  line  subscriptions  and  electricity  generation  capacity).  In  some  cases,  a  few 
modifications are made to take into account variations across countries. 
  For transport networks, adequacy can depend on population density and geographical 
features. In this light, the railway and motorway variables are constructed to take into account 
per capita provision while accounting for geographical network density with a correction to 
account for areas where one would expect network density to be lower.
29 
                                                       
28.  Primary or secondary school education and the number of years of openness used in the literature have a 
large  cross-sectional  variation  for  wide  country  cross-sections  but  exhibit  fairly  low  cross-country 
heterogeneity for OECD countries. 
29.  The railway and motorway variables are constructed as the total length of the physical network per square 
km, per population of  working age (15 to 64  years of age),  multiplied by the share  of forests in the 
country‟s total area. The forest correction factor accounts for the fact that areas covered by forest may be 
inhabited.    
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  The  telecommunication  indicator  measures  the  number  of  fixed  line  and  mobile  phone 
subscriptions per capita and thus takes account of the decline in fixed line subscription and the 
increasing  popularity  of  mobile  phones  observed  from  the  mid-1990s.  However,  line 
subscriptions is not strictly a physical measure of telecommunications networks 
  The physical indicators for energy include overall energy generation and electricity capacity as 
well as consumption which may give an indication of the quality and the size of the transmission 
and distribution networks. In this light, there are four alternative variables:  
  Energy  consumption  per  capita  that  considers  not  only  domestic 
  generation but also energy imports; 
  Energy generation per capita; 
  Electricity generation; 
  Total electricity generation capacity. 
Given  that  the  analysis  uses  a  limited  number  of  cross-sections  observations,  the  measures  of 
infrastructure  were  constructed  to  exploit  the  variation  of  these  variables  across  countries.  The 
principal components technique was used to construct one or two principal components that combine 
linearly the variance of four series (rail, motorways, telecom and energy). Four sets of principal 
components were computed using the four different measures of energy and electricity consumption 
or generation. The first two principal components account for around 80% of the total variance of the 
data. The first component is dominated by the measures of railway and motorway networks, whereas 
the  second  component  largely  reflects  variance  in  the  energy  and  telecommunications  variables 
(Appendix Table A.7). The combination coefficients or factor loadings show that an increase in the 
first and second principal component coincides with a rise in the underlying measures of physical 
infrastructure. 
Sample and country coverage 
2.  Country coverage covers all the OECD with the exception of Luxembourg. For the cross-
sections, 10-year and 8-year averages are constructed. The sample with 10-year average include at 
most  three  observations  per  country  (1977-1986,  1987-1996,  1997-2006),  whilst  maximum  four 
observations per country are available for the sample with 8-year averages (1975-1982, 1983-1990, 
1991-1998, 1999-2006). The time span of the different variables is the same for any given country.   26 
6.2  Model uncertainty and model averaging 
With a number of candidate variables there is uncertainty about which variables should be included 
in the empirical growth model. The main techniques that have been used to account for this model 
uncertainty  include  extreme  bounds  analysis,  classical  model  averaging  and  Bayesian  model 
averaging. These approaches can be roughly categorised as testing the robustness of the candidate 
variable to the inclusion of other variables or examining how the inclusion of the candidate variable 
improves the explanatory power of growth models. The following sections briefly describe these 
techniques and present results.  
6.2.1 Extreme bounds analyses (EBA) 
The extreme bounds approach of Levin and Renelt (1992) seeks to identify the sensitivity of the sign 
of a given variable to the inclusion of a number of other potential regressors. In this approach, the 
growth rate of per capita income (Y ) is regressed on the variable of interest (I ), a set of control 
variables (C ) that are always included and a set of other explanatory variables drawn from a larger 

















i i Z C I Y    , with  Z Z Z Z  3 2 1 , ,           (6) 
The lower bound is obtained as the lowest value of  in equation (6) minus two standard errors, and 
the highest values is calculated as the highest value of   plus two standard errors. If the lower and 
upper bounds are on the same side (either both negative or both positive), the variable of interest is 
labelled as being robust to the inclusion of C  and Z . However, if a single coefficient estimate of   
becomes statistically insignificant at the 5% level or switches sign, the lower and upper bounds will 
have the opposite sign, and the variable of interest will be called fragile, conditional on C  and Z . 
In  our  empirical  analysis,  we  slightly  modify  the  procedure  described  above.  The  estimated 
equations always include one principal component capturing cross country differences in physical 
infrastructure.  Five  additional  explanatory  variables  are  selected  from  the  pool  of  po ssible 
explanatory variables  Z . For each principal component, all possible 5-variable combinations from 
                                                       
30  In the original application, Levin and Renelt (1992) used three fixed control variables (m=3) and up to 3 
variables from the set of potential regressors  Z . With  I  and C  being always included, regression (1) is 
estimated for all possible combinations of Z  up to n=3..    
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the  9  possible  (non-infrastructure)  explanatory  variables  were  estimated.  The  lower  and  upper 
bounds are then calculated in order to analyse whether the measures of physical infrastructure are 
fragile or robust to the inclusion of different explanatory variables. In line with previous applications 
to cross-section growth equations, the extreme bounds analysis shows that none of the infrastructures 
measures is robust to the inclusion of the controls as the lower and upper bounds always have the 
opposite sign (Table 4).
31 Indeed, Sala -i-Martin (1997) demonstrated that none of the conventional 
explanatory variables used in empirical growth equations would pass the test of the extreme bounds 
analysis. 
Table 4.  Extreme-bound Analysis 
results
low bound high bound low bound high bound
First - mainly transport - principal component
   energy use (PC11) -5.40 3.72 -6.72 9.96
   energy generation (PC12) -4.93 2.61 -6.01 6.44
   electricity generation (PC13)  -4.26 3.43 -5.07 8.46
   electricity generation capacity (PC14) -4.84 3.74 -5.80 9.92
Second - mainly energy and 
telecommunications - principal component
   energy use (PC21) -2.75 3.76 -8.99 10.47
   energy generation (PC22) -1.44 1.16 -1.20 3.14
   electricity generation (PC23)  -2.97 3.24 -4.39 8.63
   electricity generation capacity (PC24) -2.54 3.05 -2.49 7.09
8-year averages 10-year averages
 
Note: The table reports the lower and upper coefficient estimates for the different variants of the principal components. 
 
6.2.2 Model averaging à la Sala-i-Martin (1997) 
Sala-i-Martin  (1997)  proposed  an  alternative  approach  for  assessing  variable  robustness  that 
constructs averages of the individual coefficient estimates and standard errors. Relying on equation 
(1), this approach computes weighted averages of the mean and variance of   . The weights are 
calculated  as  the  likelihood  of  a  given  model  related  to  the  summed  likelihood  of  all  estimated 
models. However, as some mis-specified models, such as those subject to endogeneity, will fit the 
data  better  and  may  thus  out-perform  other  models,  Sala-i-Martin  (1997)  also  used  unweighted 
averages. Furthermore, significance is assessed assuming that the estimated coefficients are either 
normally or not normally distributed. 
                                                       
31.  This finding is not sensitive to possible outliers. When the countries are dropped from the sample one at a 
time, the same results are obtained.   28 
The  results  of  the  model  averaging  are  presented  in  Table 5,  which  shows  the  weighted  and 
unweighted means, and the corresponding p-values under the assumptions of both normality and 
non-normality of the coefficient estimates. The results do not support the inclusion of the principal 
component measures of infrastructure when 8-year averages are used. For the 10-year averages, 
however, a positive relationship is found in some cases between the per capita growth rate and the 
second principal components (pc21, pc23 and pc24). These results are not robust (particularly for 
pc21  and  pc23)  given  that  they  are  sensitive  to  the  sample  used  and  no  relationship  could  be 
established using likelihood-based weights while assuming a normal distribution.
32 
Table 5.  Model averaging : à la Sala-i-Martin (1997) 
Panel A. 8 year averages 
coefficient coefficient 
sample Weighted normal non-normal Unweighted normal non-normal
First - mainly transport - principal component
   energy use (PC11) all -1.297 0.238 0.212 -1.212 0.269 0.242
   energy generation (PC12) all -0.95 0.359 0.373 -0.902 0.377 0.393
   electricity generation (PC13)  all -0.919 0.352 0.307 -0.839 0.395 0.348
   electricity generation capacity (PC14) all -1.153 0.283 0.25 -1.068 0.32 0.285
Second - mainly energy and 
telecommunications - principal component
   energy use (PC21) all 0.449 0.603 0.461 0.581 0.491 0.352
   energy generation (PC22) all -0.105 0.745 0.713 -0.08 0.805 0.771
   electricity generation (PC23)  all 0.113 0.883 0.82 0.202 0.791 0.726
   electricity generation capacity (PC24) all 0.195 0.785 0.721 0.277 0.695 0.628
p-value  p-value 
 
Panel B. 10 year averages 
coefficient coefficient 
sample Weighted normal non-normal Unweighted normal non-normal
First - mainly transport - principal component
   energy use (PC11) all 0.688 0.738 0.744 0.885 0.663 0.661
   energy generation (PC12) all -0.263 0.88 0.896 -0.203 0.905 0.923
   electricity generation (PC13)  all 1.132 0.493 0.494 1.341 0.412 0.405
   electricity generation capacity (PC14) all 1.168 0.547 0.552 1.386 0.47 0.467
Second - mainly energy and 
telecommunications - principal component
   energy use (PC21) excl _BEL 1.404 0.505 0.216 2.274 0.249 0.049
excl _FRA 1.393 0.503 0.199 2.299 0.237 0.038
excl _IRL 1.603 0.437 0.172 2.496 0.195 0.036
excl _KOR 2.067 0.29 0.136 2.663 0.157 0.049
excl _MEX 2.895 0.124 0.042 3.617 0.041 0.007
excl _NZL 1.465 0.466 0.161 2.407 0.196 0.025
excl _NOR 1.463 0.541 0.199 2.343 0.293 0.046
excl _GBR 1.421 0.519 0.214 2.317 0.259 0.045
   energy generation (PC22) all 0.373 0.5 0.54 0.411 0.459 0.486
   electricity generation (PC23)  all 1.827 0.249 0.235 2.129 0.176 0.162
excl _NOR 2.711 0.208 0.1 3.305 0.102 0.036
   electricity generation capacity (PC24) all 2.045 0.128 0.072 2.435 0.056 0.025
p-value  p-value 
 
 
Note: Figures in bold indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
                                                       
32.  If outliers are accounted for, the unweighted p-values with a non-normal distribution (the ratio of the 
coefficient estimate over the standard errors) are lower than 0.05 and the unweighted coefficients exhibit a 
positive sign.    
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6.2.3 Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE) 
A more recent approach to addressing model uncertainty is to assess whether the inclusion of a 
candidate variable improves the fit of the model (Sala-i-Martin et al. 2004). This approach estimates 
all possible combinations of the (K) candidate explanatory variables, which is given by
K 2 , or some 
subset of models.
33 Given the relatively low number of potential explanatory variables used here, all 
possible models are estimated.  
The Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE) determines the posterior probability attributed 
to each single model  j M that includes the variable of interest and conditioned on the underlying 
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where SSE is the sum of squared residuals, T is the number of observations, k denotes the number of 
explanatory variables included in the specific model and K is the number of all explanatory variables 
considered.  Expression  (7)  gives  the  contribution  of  a  given model  to  explaining  the  dependent 
variable as compared to the other models. Expression (7) is then summed up for the models that 
contain the variable of interest to obtain the posterior inclusion probability of this variable. If the 
posterior inclusion probability is higher than the prior inclusion probability, one can conclude that 
the candidate variable should be included in the estimated models.
34 
The posterior mean and the square root of the variance (standard error) conditional on inclusion can 
be used  to obtain t-statistics and to determine the significance of the individual variables upon 
inclusion. The posterior mean conditional on inclusion ( ) ( y E  ) is the average of the individual 
OLS estimates weighted by  ) ( y M P j . As the unconditional posterior mean considers all regressions 
(even those without the variable of interest), the unconditional posterior mean of any given variable 
                                                       
33.  If the number of models to be estimated is too large, techniques such as Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo, 
stochastic  search  variable  selection,  or  random  sampling  are  alternative  approaches  to  estimating  all 
possible models. 
34.  Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) compare the posterior inclusion probability to a prior inclusion probability for 
their 67 explanatory variables in 7 variable models. The prior inclusion probability is then 7/67=0.1044.   30 
can  be  derived  as  the  product  of  the  conditional  posterior  mean  and  the  posterior  inclusion 
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In addition, White‟s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors are used in all estimations, which 
include not only the full sample but also sub samples which exclude one country at a time. This jack-
knifing  of  the  sample  makes  it  possible  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  individual  countries  on  the 
robustness of the results and to identify potential outliers. All explanatory variables were used with a 
one period lag (8 to 10 years) in order to minimise potential problems with endogeneity that may 
potentially affect most of the explanatory variables.
35  
The random sampling procedures employed in previous applications of model averaging have often 
experienced difficulties by duplicating the estimation of particular models because they fails to 
distinguish between identical models.
36  When the recurrence of different orderings of the same 
variables is not controlled for, good models including more variables receive a considerably higher 
weight than similarly performing models including fewer variables. The approach adopted here 
eliminates the bias towards larger models by ensuring that each model is only estimated once.  
Nonlinear extensions 
An extension to the basic approach is to assess possible nonlinear links between infrastructure and 
economic growth. This possibility can be addressed using threshold models proposed by Hansen 
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1           (9a) 
where    is the threshold variable and T denotes the threshold value that separates the two regimes. 
This type of model can be easily extended to three or even more regimes such as in equation (4b): 
                                                       
35.  The (first difference and system) GMM estimator would necessitate at least three observations per country. 
There are some countries  in the sample that  have less than three observations  for the 8- and 10-year 
averages. Therefore, 5-year averages were used for the GMM estimator for the specification including all 
variables comparing with fixed effect OLS estimates to check whether or not endogeniety is a real concern. 
36  Such as, Y=a+bX1+cX2+dX3 or Y=a+ bX2+cX1+ dX3 or Y=a+ bX3+cX2+dX1    
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Equation  (4a)  integrated  into  a  BACE  framework  is  termed  Bayesian  Averaging  of  Thresholds 
(BAT) (Crespo-Cuaresma and Doppelhofer, 2007). The BAT technique relies on a random sampling 
procedure for the variables of interest as well as a random sampling of the threshold variable in order 
to estimate the non-linear model instead of the linear model. The BAT approach reveals the inclusion 
probability  for  the  nonlinear  explanatory  variable  and  the  corresponding  threshold  values  of  the 
threshold variable, but it does not test whether      - in equation (9) - and whether the nonlinear 
variant of the model is superior to the linear version.
37 
The approach used here to analyse non -linearity tests explicitly whether the li near variant of the 
model can be rejected in favour of the nonlinear variant. This is done in two approaches:  
  The first approach selects the variables that pass the inclusion test from the linear 
model averaging, estimates the OLS model, and analyses nonlinearity within this model. 
  The second approach, more in the spirit of model averaging, estimates all the possible 
combinations of the candidate explanatory variables. For each combination, the linear, two-
regime and three-regime model for the nonlinear variable are estimated. An advantage of 
this methodology is that only a single linear or non-linear model is selected for a given set 
of explanatory variables. 
The selection between linear and nonlinear models is done as follows. The first step estimates the 
linear model and the two-regime model. A grid search with steps of 1% of the distribution is carried 
out to find the value of the threshold variable (principal component measure of infrastructure) that 
minimizes the sum of squared residuals of the estimated two-regime model.
381 Hansen (1999) shows 
                                                       
37.  Note that the prior inclusion probability for the nonlinear and threshold variables are considerably lower in 
the BAT modelling framework than in the standard linear modelling framework because the prior inclusion 
probability accounts not only for the number of potential variables but also for the grid search of the 
threshold variable. The prior inclusion probability decreases with the number of steps used for the grid 
search. 
38   While steps of 1% in the grid search seem to be sufficient given the sample size of about 80 observations, 
steps of 0.1% were also used. The estimated threshold that separates the two regimes did not change. The   32 
that the null hypothesis of  2 1     from equations (9a) can be tested using a likelihood ratio test. 
Given that the likelihood ratio test statistic does not follow a standard asymptotic distribution as the 
threshold value  is  not identified  under the null hypothesis, the  distribution of the test statistic is 
obtained through bootstrapping (Hansen, 1999). The bootstrap procedure consists in the following 
steps: 
1. The linear and nonlinear models that minimise the sum of squared residuals are estimated 
and the likelihood ratio test computed. 
2. Repeated random draws with the probability of 1/n at each draw are made from the residuals 
of the alternative model to construct the bootstrapped residual. 
3. The bootstrapped dependent variable is obtained using the bootstrapped residuals of the 
alternative  model  (two-regime  model)  and  the  coefficient  estimates  of  the  benchmark 
model (linear model). 
4. The models that are tested against each other (linear versus two-regime, and two-regime vs. 
three-regime models) are re-estimated and the likelihood ratio tests re-calculated. 
5. Steps 2 to 4 are repeated 1 000 and 500 times for respectively for the simple non-linear 
model  and  the  non-linear  models  imbedded  in  model  averaging,  respectively.  The 
likelihood ratio tests obtained on the basis of the bootstrapped sample are then saved. 
6. The likelihood ratio test from the original sample is compared with the upper 90%, 95% or 
99% of the distribution of the bootstrapped likelihood ratio tests. If the likelihood ratio test 
statistic rejects the null hypothesis of the linear model against the two-regime model (on 
the basis of the bootstrapped critical values), whether there are three different regimes 
rather than only two regimes is also analysed. A three-regime model is estimated based on 
two threshold values of the threshold variable that minimise the sum of squared residuals 
across the estimated models.
39 The bootstrap procedure described above is applied to the 
two-regime and three-regime models. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
grid search starts at 25% of the distribution and stops at 75% to ensure that at least 20 observations fall in 
one particular regime. 
39   The threshold from the two -regime model is held fixed and a grid search is used to identify the second 
threshold. We impose the restriction that the two thresholds  should be separated at least by 25% of our 
sample observations. Once the second threshold is identified, a backward grid search is done to identify the 
first threshold as suggested by Hansen (1999).    
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6.3.4 Empirical results: the case of linearity 
The full results (presented in Appendix Tables A.8 and A.9) reveal that important drivers of GDP per 
capita growth include, as expected, initial per capita income as well as openness, life expectancy and 
human capital. Government investment (a proxy for the tax burden on the economy) as well as 
investment price inflation as expected relate negatively with economic growth. These results are 
broadly in line with earlier findings (OECD, 2003; Sala-i-Martin et al. 2004).
 40 
The  results  concerning  the  infrastructure  variables  of  model  averaging  for  the  full  sample  are 
presented in Table 6. The posterior inclusion probability of the first principal component, which 
mainly  measures  railway  and  motorways  infrastructure,  is  almost  always  higher  than  the  prior 
inclusion probability of 0.5 (50%). In these models, the mean of the principal component is unstable 
and never statistically significant. The second principal component, which measures mainly energy 
and  telecommunications  infrastructure,  is  generally  found  to  have  high  estimated  inclusion 
probabilities, always  exceeding  0.5  (50%)  regardless  of  the  averaging  method.  Furthermore,  the 
mean is significant.  
Table 6.   Full model averaging results 
linearity, full sample  
First - mainly transport - principal component
   energy use (PC11) 1 * -0.02 1.15 0.5 * 0.7 1.45
   energy generation (PC12) 1 * -0.29 1.02 0.36 0.04 0.54
   electricity generation (PC13)  1 * 0.23 1 0.73 * 1.35 1.8
   electricity generation capacity (PC14) 1 * 0.12 1.12 0.68 * 1.31 2.08
Second - mainly energy and 
telecommunications - principal component
   energy use (PC21) 1 * 1.69 0.61 1 * 5.73 1.12 *
   energy generation (PC22) 1 * 0.15 0.34 0.72 * 0.44 0.37
   electricity generation (PC23)  1 * 0.96 0.68 1 * 2.91 1.19 *













Note: inclusion probability is the posterior inclusion probability, the mean and standard error are the posteriors conditional on 
inclusion. * indicates that the estimated inclusion probability is higher than 0.50, and that the mean/s.e. ratio is higher than 2. 
 
                                                       
40.  Given  the  possibility  of  endogeneity  in  the  relationship  between  infrastructure  and  growth,  the  (first 
difference)  GMM  estimator  was  used  for  the  specification  including  all  variables  and  using  5 year 
averages. These results are compared with fixed effect estimates. The results suggest that for this sample 
there is not a major problem of endogenity for the explanatory variables. The results are reported in the 
Appendix (Table A.10).   34 
In order to check the robustness of the results for the infrastructure variables, the model averaging 
was also conducted for sub-samples that dropped one country at a time (The results are presented in 
Figures 3 and 4, see also Appendix Figures A.1 and A.2).   
 The mainly transportation (railways and motorways) principal component: Figure 4 shows 
the inclusion probability is almost always above 0.5 and most frequently 1 when 8 year 
averages are used, but is often below 0.5 for some versions of the principal components 
when 10 year averages are used.
41In addition, the distribution of the estimated means 
suggests that these results are sensitive to the inclusion of particular countries given that 
changes in the sample can switch the sign of the posterior mean. Overall, the relation 
between the first principal component and economic growth is not very robust. 
 The mainly energy and telecommunications principal component: Figure 5 shows that the 
inclusion probability is nearly always 1 for almost all the variants of the second principal 
component. Furthermore, the estimated means of the infrastructure variables always have 
a positive sign both for the whole sample and all sub-samples.
42 Overall, variants of the 
second principal components (with one exception) appear to have a strong positive 
relationship to economic growth. 
                                                       
41.  This  is  particularly  the  case  when  New  Zealand  and  Germany  are  excluded  from  the  sample.  When 
Portugal is dropped from the sample, the inclusion probability for the only principal component that falls 
below 50% in the full sample jumps to around 80%. 
42.  Problems arise only for the second variant of the second principal component for 10 -year averages when 
Germany, New Zealand and Portugal are excluded from the sample. In these cases, the estimated inclusion 
probabilities drop slightly below 50%.    
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Figure 3.  Inclusion probabilities and posterior means; transport  
8 year averages 
















































































(with electricity generation capacity)
 






































































(with electricity generation capacity)
  
Note: Panel A is a histogram of the distribution of the estimates inclusion probabilities for all estimates (full sample and sub-
samples that drop a single country from the sample). The vertical axis shows the number of models for which the values of the 
inclusion probability are shown on the horizontal axis are estimated. 
Panel B is a histogram of the distribution of the posterior mean conditional on inclusion for all estimates (full sample and sub-
samples that drop a single country from the sample). The vertical axis shows the number of models for which the values of the 
estimated mean are shown on the horizontal axis are estimated.   36 
Figure 4.  Inclusion probabilities and posterior means; energy and telecoms 
8 year averages 













































































energy and telecommunication component
(with electrivity generation capacity)
 







































































energy and telecommunication component
(with electricity generation capacity)
 
Note: Panel A is a histogram of the distribution of the estimates inclusion probabilities for all estimates (full sample and sub-
samples that drop a single country from the sample). The vertical axis shows the number of models for which the values of the 
inclusion probability are shown on the horizontal axis are estimated. 
Panel B is a histogram of the distribution of the posterior mean conditional on inclusion for all estimates (full sample and sub-
samples that drop a single country from the sample). The vertical axis shows the number of models for which the values of the 
estimated mean are shown on the horizontal axis are estimated.    
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6.3.5 Empirical results: the case of nonlinearity 
Non-linearity in a simple framework 
To test for the non-linearity of the impact of the different measures of infrastructure on growth, the 
first approach uses the variables with posterior probabilities exceeding prior probabilities from the 
linear full model averaging.
43 The estimation results reported in Appendix Table A.11 provide little 
robust empirical evidence in favour of non-linearity for the various measures of the first principal 
component capturing railway and motorway networks and the coefficients are also generally found 
to be statistically insignificant. 
The results for the second principal component, reflec ting energy and telecommunication, provide 
stronger support for nonlinear effects of infrastructure on growth (Table  7, Annex Table A.12). The 
two-regime model is selected against the linear and the three -regime models for three of the four 
versions of the second principal component when 8-year averages or 10-year averages are used. The 
coefficients in the lower and upper regimes are statistically significant and have a positive sign for 
4 (2) versions of the principal component for the 8 -year (10-year) averages. Furthermore, the 
coefficients in the lower regime are considerable larger than those in the upper regime. This implies 
that an increase in physical infrastructure in energy and telecommunication has a considerable 
stronger impact on economic growth if the level of physical infrastructure is lower. 




nd principal component (PC21) 
With energy use 
2
nd principal component (PC22) 
With energy generation 
 








Low  1.376**  2.770***  2.437**  0.140  0.892  1.321 
High/mid 
 
1.578***  0.960 
 
0.227  0.624 
high 
   
1.666*** 
   
0.228 
p-value (bootstrap)  0.004  0.447 
 
0.209  0.549 
 
2
nd principal component (PC23) 
With electricity generation 
2
nd principal component (PC24) 
With electricity generation capacity 
 








Low  0.770  2.831**  1.724*  0.747  2.470***  2.176** 
High/mid 
 
1.365**  1.011 
 
1.184**  0.752 
high 
   
1.361** 




0.077  0.721 
 
0.013 
             
                                                       
43.  The approach estimates the linear, two-regime and three-regime models using the Likelihood Ratio (LR) 
test statistic with the boostrapped critical values to test for nonlinearity.   38 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. P-values lower than 0.1, 0.05 and 
0.01 indicate that the null hypothesis of the linear model (2-regime model) can be rejected against the alternative hypothesis of the 
2-regime model (3-regime model). 
 
Non-linearity in a Bayesian model averaging framework 
The  second  approach  to  analysing  nonlinearity  incorporates  the  nonlinear  models  in  the  model 
averaging framework.
44 The results for the first principal component are mixed, with positive and 
negative effects of infrastructure on growth estimated for different regimes and for th e various 
infrastructure measures (see Appendix Tables  A.13-A.16). The results for the second principal 
component provided somewhat stronger evidence of nonlinear effects in particular when 8 -year 
averages are used (Table  8). The two-regime model is select ed for three of four variants of the 
principal  component.  The  coefficient  estimates  of  the  infrastructure  measures  are  always 
considerably larger in the lower regime than in the higher regime.  
Table 8.  Results of model averaging – nonlinearity of the infrastructure variable 
8-year averages, 2
nd principal component 
 
 
  PC21 
With energy use 
  PC22 
With energy generation 
  Inclusion 
probability 
  mean  s.e.  Inclusion 
probability 
  mean  s.e. 
Linear  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.586  *  0.085  0.241 
2-regime  1.000  * 
   
0.412   
       lower regime 
 
  2.633  4.501 
 
  0.643  0.557 
   higher regime      1.524  1.511 
 
  0.119  0.168 
3-regime  0.000   
   
0.000   
       low regime 
 
  0.000  0.000 
 
  0.000  0.000 
   middle regime      0.000  0.000 
 
  0.000  0.000 
   high regime      0.000  0.000 
 
  0.000  0.000 
    PC23 
With electricity generation 
  PC24 
With electricity generation capacity 
  Inclusion 
probability 
  mean  s.e.  Inclusion 
probability 
  mean  s.e. 
Linear  0.002    0.002  0.002  0.000    0.000  0.000 
2-regime  0.998  * 
   
1.000  * 
       lower regime 
 
  2.705  3.750 
 
  2.596  4.088 
   higher regime 
 
  1.312  1.111 
 
  1.236  1.041 
3-regime  0.000   
   
0.000   
       low regime 
 
  0.000  0.000 
 
  0.000  0.000 
   middle regime 
 
  0.000  0.000 
 
  0.000  0.000 
   high regime 
 
  0.000  0.000 
 
  0.000  0.000 
 
Note: * indicates that the estimated inclusion probability is higher than 0.50 
 
                                                       
44  The selection of the linear and nonlinear models is carried out at the 5% level of significance.    
  39 
7.  Conclusions 
This  paper  analysed  the  relation  between  infrastructure  investment  and  economic  growth.  We 
emphasised issues related to data quality limits. For instance, national account data for investment or 
capital stocks in infrastructure sectors are available in long series for only a handful of countries and 
still contain methodological differences. Measures of infrastructure quality are even more scarce and 
of poorer comparability. Overall, the most robust available measures of infrastructure for a sample of 
OECD countries over time are physical indicators. We pointed out that much of the literature seems 
to  confuse  infrastructure  with  public  capital  stocks  or  public  investment,  which,  due  to 
corporatisation,  privatisation  and  market  liberalisation  are  increasingly  unreliable  measures  of 
infrastructure. 
Keeping this in mind, our empirical results based on annual time-series growth regressions indicate 
that the contributions of infrastructure to long-run output levels and growth are not homogenous 
across countries and that the expansion of infrastructure could be both more or less productive with 
respect to other capital expenditure. Furthermore, the result that more does not always mean better 
(in terms of GDP per capita) seems to be robust across different specifications including control 
variables such as human capital, trade openness and tax revenues. Importantly, the validity of the full 
sample estimates holds for more recent years, and in most countries the effect does not seem to 
change.  
We  identified  a  robust  positive  and  highly  nonlinear  link  between  infrastructure  and  economic 
growth using low-frequency multi-annual average using Bayesian averaging of classical estimates. 
The cross-section growth regressions suggests greater provision of broad measures of infrastructure 
is associated with higher subsequent growth rates and that the link is non-linear, with a potentially 
higher impact of additional infrastructure in countries with initially lower levels of provision.    40 
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Appendix: Supplementary tables and Figures 
[Table A.1. Single series ADF unit root tests for selected variables.] 
 
maximum lags =2
AIC criterion for selection stat. p-val. obs. stat. p-val. obs. stat. p-val. obs.
GDP per capita (PPP)
          Australia -0.49 0.88 44 -2.60 0.28 45 -5.20 0.00 *** 44
          Austria -4.36 0.00 *** 46 -2.52 0.32 46 -1.88 0.34 43
          Belgium -4.02 0.00 *** 46 -2.72 0.23 46 -3.04 0.04 ** 44
          Canada -1.37 0.59 45 -4.01 0.02 ** 45 -4.91 0.00 *** 45
          Denmark -1.49 0.53 40 -4.19 0.01 ** 39 -5.18 0.00 *** 39
          Finland -0.88 0.79 44 -2.36 0.39 44 -4.63 0.00 *** 44
          France -2.46 0.13 42 -2.72 0.23 42 -3.52 0.01 *** 42
          Greece -2.40 0.15 45 -2.21 0.47 45 -4.51 0.00 *** 45
          Iceland -1.66 0.44 44 -2.17 0.50 44 -4.87 0.00 *** 44
          Ireland 0.65 0.99 45 -1.59 0.78 45 -4.38 0.00 *** 45
          Italy -4.95 0.00 *** 46 -2.45 0.35 46 -4.76 0.00 *** 45
          Japan -3.16 0.03 ** 45 -2.02 0.58 45 -1.90 0.33 43
          Korea -0.40 0.90 36 -1.85 0.66 36 -5.54 0.00 *** 35
          Mexico -3.55 0.01 ** 45 -2.68 0.25 45 -4.06 0.00 *** 45
          Netherlands -1.25 0.65 45 -2.44 0.35 45 -3.73 0.01 *** 45
          New Zealand -0.32 0.91 46 -1.92 0.63 46 -6.53 0.00 *** 45
          Norway -1.79 0.38 45 -1.20 0.90 45 -4.24 0.00 *** 45
          Portugal -2.50 0.12 45 -1.95 0.61 45 -4.02 0.00 *** 45
          Spain -1.48 0.54 45 -2.47 0.34 45 -3.53 0.01 *** 45
          Sweden -1.56 0.50 44 -2.77 0.22 45 -4.17 0.00 *** 45
          Switzerland -1.73 0.41 39 -4.00 0.02 ** 40 -4.25 0.00 *** 39
          Turkey -1.24 0.65 46 -2.48 0.34 46 -7.28 0.00 *** 45
          United Kingdom -0.88 0.79 44 -3.05 0.13 45 -5.29 0.00 *** 44
          United States -0.80 0.81 44 -3.82 0.02 ** 45 -5.03 0.00 *** 44
Total investment to GDP
          Australia -1.70 0.43 46 -2.59 0.29 45 -5.49 0.00 *** 44
          Austria -1.18 0.68 46 -2.94 0.16 46 -6.50 0.00 *** 45
          Belgium -1.94 0.31 45 -2.24 0.46 45 -5.04 0.00 *** 45
          Canada -2.49 0.12 45 -3.38 0.07 * 45 -4.98 0.00 *** 43
          Denmark -1.94 0.31 45 -1.99 0.59 45 -5.48 0.00 *** 45
          Finland -2.01 0.28 45 -3.33 0.07 * 45 -4.48 0.00 *** 43
          France -1.64 0.46 45 -2.45 0.35 45 -4.21 0.00 *** 45
          Greece -2.25 0.19 46 -2.31 0.42 46 -6.65 0.00 *** 45
          Iceland -1.46 0.55 45 -1.38 0.85 45 -6.08 0.00 *** 45
          Ireland -2.00 0.28 45 -1.98 0.60 45 -4.56 0.00 *** 45
          Italy -1.75 0.40 44 -2.22 0.47 44 -5.68 0.00 *** 44
          Japan -1.22 0.66 45 -2.46 0.35 45 -4.39 0.00 *** 44
          Korea -2.64 0.09 * 34 -1.68 0.74 34 -6.17 0.00 *** 34
          Mexico -3.27 0.02 ** 45 -3.24 0.09 * 45 -6.23 0.00 *** 45
          Netherlands -1.01 0.74 46 -2.65 0.26 44 -5.85 0.00 *** 45
          New Zealand -3.00 0.04 45 -2.99 0.14 45 -5.80 0.00 *** 45
          Norway -0.91 0.77 44 -3.04 0.13 45 -5.10 0.00 *** 44
          Portugal -3.06 0.04 ** 45 -3.20 0.10 * 45 -4.88 0.00 *** 44
          Spain -2.06 0.26 45 -2.07 0.55 45 -3.90 0.00 *** 45
          Sweden -1.86 0.35 45 -3.74 0.03 ** 45 -4.21 0.00 *** 44
          Switzerland -2.22 0.20 45 -4.36 0.01 * 45 -4.41 0.00 *** 44
          Turkey -3.35 0.02 ** 34 -3.36 0.07 * 34 -6.60 0.00 *** 33
          United Kingdom -2.84 0.06 ** 45 -3.34 0.07 * 45 -4.73 0.00 *** 45
          United States -2.45 0.13 44 -2.45 0.35 44 -5.67 0.00 *** 44
ADF constant, no trend ADF constant, trend ADF constant, first diff.
 
*, **, *** denote that the null hypothesis of a unit root in the series can be rejected at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels. 
[Table A.2. Panel unit root test results for the main variables]    44 
variable
maxlags =2, AIC stat. p-val. obs. stat. p-val. obs. stat. p-val. obs. stat. p-val. obs.
GDP per capita (PPP) -4.39 0 *** 1024 -15.57 0 *** 1045 -2.54 0.01 ** 1060 -16.68 0 *** 1045
Total Investment/GDP -1.05 0.15 1012 -21.23 0 *** 1011 -3.51 0 *** 1023 -20.28 0 *** 1011
Population growth 0.51 0.7 1027 -3.81 0 *** 1015 2.66 1 1027 -6.91 0 *** 1015
Electricity (per capita) -3.9 0 *** 1022 -9.72 0 *** 989 2.69 1 1022 -10.35 0 *** 989
Telephone mainln. (per cap.) 4.54 1 1006 0.13 0.55 990 13.14 1 1006 -1.31 0.09 * 990
Telephone subs. (per cap.) -2.02 0.02 ** 946 -4.64 0 *** 939 2.26 0.99 946 -5.94 0 *** 939
Roads (per capita) -0.39 0.35 905 -24.58 0 *** 887 1.16 0.88 905 -22.82 0 *** 887
Rail (per capita) -1.02 0.15 910 -16.19 0 *** 893 1.34 0.91 910 -16.55 0 *** 893
Motorway (per capita) -12.95 0 *** 664 -19 0 *** 643 -11.81 0 *** 664 -14.02 0 *** 643
Human Capital -2.7 0 *** 672 -9.5 0 *** 664 -0.55 0.29 672 -8.83 0 *** 664
Private Investment/GDP -2.13 0.02 ** 865 -17.73 0 *** 850 -3.18 0 *** 865 -17.49 0 *** 850
Capital Stock -3.68 0 *** 695 -12.86 0 *** 687 -2.22 0.01 695 -8.42 0 *** 687
Tax revenue/GDP -0.02 0.49 529 -10.08 0 *** 503 0.44 0.67 529 -11.58 0 *** 503
Trade Openness  -0.83 0.2 1026 -25.94 0 *** 1009 -1.69 0.05 * 1026 -24.03 0 *** 1009
Electricity -4.36 0 *** 1020 -8.86 0 *** 988 2.24 0.99 1020 -9.52 0 *** 988
Telephone mainlines 5.13 1 1008 0.89 0.81 988 13.79 1 1008 -0.18 0.43 988
Telephone subscriptions -2.14 0.02 ** 946 -4.19 0 *** 938 2.42 0.99 946 -5.35 0 *** 938
Roads -2.79 0 *** 911 -25.23 0 *** 887 0.13 0.55 911 -23.94 0 *** 887
Rail -1.01 0.16 914 -19.55 0 *** 895 2.4 0.99 914 -19.69 0 *** 895
Motorway -14.43 0 *** 666 -18.48 0 *** 642 -13.08 0 *** 666 -13.7 0 *** 642
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003)
constants, trends first differences, constants constants, trends first differences, constants
 
*, **, *** denote that the null hypothesis of a unit root in the series can be rejected at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels. 
 
 
[Table A.3. Cointegration tests of the basic equations] 
Lag selection = AIC, maximum = 2
country specific constant & trend stat. p-val. stat. p-val.
Y, Invest_total, n, Roads 6.67 0.00 -2.54 0.01
Y, Invest_total, n, Rail 7.89 0.00 -2.75 0.00
Y, Invest_total, n, Motorways 12.02 0.00 -6.22 0.00
Y, Invest_total, n, Electricity 6.74 0.00 -2.73 0.00
Y, Invest_total, n, Tele_mainlines 3.54 0.00 -2.67 0.00
Y, Invest_total, n, Tele_subscriptions 6.04 0.00 -3.96 0.00
with human capital:
Y, Invest_total, n, Roads, HumanCapital 4.40 0.00 -1.86 0.03
Y, Invest_total, n, Rail,  HumanCapital 5.00 0.00 -1.93 0.03
Y, Invest_total, n, Motorways,  HumanCapital 4.16 0.00 -4.07 0.00
Y, Invest_total, n, Electricity,  HumanCapital 4.03 0.00 -1.76 0.04
Y, Invest_total, n, Tele_mainlines, HumanCapital 4.25 0.00 -1.50 0.07






The null hypothesis in both tests is no cointegration. Pedroni (1999) test allows individual (heterogenous) cointegrating relationships; Kao (1999) 
assumes a common (homogenous) relationship.    
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[Table A.4. Bi-variate Granger causality tests for single series] 
single series
number of lags = 4
first differences, constant
Roads
    Denmark 0.40 0.03 **
    Japan 0.02 ** 0.97
    Netherlands 0.08 * 0.21
Motorways
    France 0.01 *** 0.16
    Italy 0.02 ** 0.36
    Sweden 0.02 ** 0.87
Rail
    Australia 0.06 * 0.81
    France 0.13 0.04 **
Electricity
    Greece 0.02 ** 0.06 *
    Iceland 0.07 * 0.33
    Italy 0.07 * 0.11
    Japan 0.44 0.01 **
    Mexico 0.35 0.02 **
    Norway 0.09 * 0.30
    Spain 0.05 ** 0.50
Telephone mainlines
    Japan 0.04 ** 0.07 *
    Mexico 0.82 0.03 **
    Portugal 0.04 ** 0.23
    Spain 0.48 0.01 ***
Telephone subscriptions
    Korea 0.30 0.02 **
    Mexico 0.02 ** 0.59









1.  Only reported if the lack one of Grange causality in at least one direction is rejected. 
2.  *, **, *** denote that the null hypothesis can be rejected at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels. 
 
[Table A.5. Panel bi-variate Granger causality test results] 
homogenous panel
with country fixed effects
number of lags = 4
first differences
Road 0.71 0.09 *
Motorways 0.18 0.22
Rail 0.36 0.07 **
Electricity 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
Telephone mainlines 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
Telephone subscriptions 0.15 0.02 *
Null hypothesis
Output does not cause infrastructure
            p-value             p-value
Infrastructure does not cause output
 
3.  The test assumes the homogeneity of coefficients.  
4.  *, **, *** denote that the null hypothesis can be rejected at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively   46 
 
[Table A.6. Panel coefficient estimates with homogenous coefficient assumptions] 
Investment 0.15 *** 0.3 *** 0.16 ***
Population growth 0.03 *** -0.01 0.04 ***
Human Capital 0.68 *** 0.15 0.04
Infrastructure -0.19 *** 0.09 *** 0.05
Trend 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 ***
Obs.
Investment 0.15 *** 0.18 *** 0.16 ***
Population growth 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 ***
Human Capital 0.14 0.11 0.28 ***
Infrastructure 0.09 *** 0.12 *** -0.03 **
Trend 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 ***
Obs. 637 634 618
Road Motorway Rail
Electricity Telephone main. Telephone subs.
557 484 605
 
5.  Long run coefficients reported. Panel includes country specific fixed effects. Dynamic OLS used.  
6.   *, **, *** denote that the significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively. 
 
 
[Table A.7.. Principal components: Factor loadings ] 
 
Energy 1 
WDI – energy 
use 
Energy 2 
WDI – energy 
consumption 
Energy 3 
IEA – electricity 
generation 
Energy 4 




st PC  2
nd PC  1
st PC  2
nd PC  1
st PC  2
nd PC  1
st PC  2
nd PC 
Cumulative 
variance  0.44  0.79  0.45  0.75  0.45  0.79  0.44  0.80 
 
loadings  loadings  loadings  loadings 
1 (energy)  0.07  0.71  -0.19  0.69  0.24  0.67  0.09  0.71 
2 (motorw)  0.70  -0.11  0.69  0.06  0.66  -0.25  0.69  -0.15 
3 (rail)  0.67  -0.21  0.68  -0.04  0.64  -0.31  0.67  -0.21 
4 (telecom)  0.26  0.66  0.16  0.72  0.32  0.62  0.27  0.65 
Cumulative 
variance  0.45  0.80  0.45  0.76  0.46  0.79  0.45  0.80 
 
loadings  loadings  loadings  loadings 
1 (energy)  0.04  0.72  -0.19  0.70  0.23  0.68  0.09  0.72 
2 (motorw)  0.70  -0.09  0.69  0.05  0.66  -0.26  0.69  -0.15 
3 (rail)  0.67  -0.19  0.68  -0.04  0.64  -0.29  0.67  -0.21 
4 (telecom)  0.25  0.66  0.17  0.72  0.32  0.62  0.27  0.65 
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Table A.8. Full model averaging, 1
st principal component  
linearity, full sample 
PANEL A: 5-year averages 
 




mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e. 
capita(-1)  0.88  -3.41  3.97  0.96  -4.05  3.37  0.78  -2.86  4.46  0.86  -3.28  4.13 
life_exp(-1)  0.37  0.10  0.09  0.50  0.15  0.12  0.35  0.09  0.09  0.37  0.10  0.09 
cpi(-1)  0.11  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.00  0.00 
reg(-1)  0.51  -0.28  0.21  0.36  -0.17  0.15  0.60  -0.35  0.24  0.56  -0.31  0.22 
d_lf(-1)  0.15  0.07  0.10  0.13  0.05  0.08  0.17  0.09  0.12  0.16  0.08  0.11 
open(-1)  1.00  0.10  0.02  1.00  0.10  0.03  1.00  0.10  0.02  1.00  0.10  0.02 
inv_gov(-1)  0.13  -0.01  0.03  0.12  -0.01  0.02  0.14  -0.02  0.03  0.13  -0.02  0.03 
inv_price(-1)  0.92  -0.05  0.03  0.94  -0.05  0.03  0.93  -0.05  0.03  0.93  -0.05  0.03 
edu(-1)  0.39  0.19  0.17  0.34  0.16  0.15  0.37  0.18  0.17  0.38  0.19  0.17 
infrastr(-1)  1.00  -1.30  1.10  1.00  -1.48  0.81  1.00  -1.52  1.05  1.00  -1.39  1.11 
PANEL B: 8-year  averages 
 




mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e. 
capita(-1)  1.00  -7.03  2.56  1.00  -7.09  2.37  1.00  -7.14  2.61  1.00  -7.07  2.58 
life_exp(-1)  0.56  0.17  0.10  0.61  0.19  0.11  0.52  0.15  0.10  0.54  0.16  0.10 
cpi(-1)  0.43  0.01  0.02  0.43  0.01  0.02  0.42  0.01  0.02  0.43  0.01  0.02 
reg(-1)  0.15  -0.02  0.03  0.15  -0.02  0.03  0.14  -0.02  0.03  0.15  -0.02  0.03 
d_lf(-1)  0.12  0.00  0.06  0.12  0.00  0.06  0.12  -0.01  0.07  0.12  -0.01  0.07 
open(-1)  0.74  0.03  0.02  0.77  0.03  0.02  0.73  0.03  0.02  0.73  0.03  0.02 
inv_gov(-1)  0.54  -0.14  0.08  0.48  -0.12  0.08  0.57  -0.15  0.09  0.55  -0.14  0.09 
inv_price(-1)  0.66  -0.04  0.02  0.66  -0.04  0.02  0.65  -0.03  0.02  0.66  -0.04  0.02 
edu(-1)  1.00  0.93  0.29  0.99  0.90  0.30  1.00  0.95  0.28  1.00  0.94  0.28 
infrastr(-1)  1.00  -0.02  1.15  1.00  -0.29  1.02  1.00  0.23  1.00  1.00  0.12  1.12 
PANEL C: 10-year  averages 
 




mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e. 
capita(-1)  1.00  -11.20  2.97  1.00  -11.05  3.05  1.00  -11.26  2.67  1.00  -11.28  2.86 
life_exp(-1)  1.00  0.67  0.21  1.00  0.70  0.22  1.00  0.64  0.18  1.00  0.64  0.19 
cpi(-1)  0.85  -0.10  0.04  0.86  -0.10  0.04  0.84  -0.09  0.04  0.84  -0.09  0.04 
reg(-1)  0.90  -0.57  0.31  0.93  -0.62  0.32  0.75  -0.42  0.29  0.83  -0.50  0.30 
d_lf(-1)  0.32  0.31  0.57  0.32  0.32  0.60  0.29  0.26  0.49  0.32  0.30  0.55 
open(-1)  0.27  0.01  0.01  0.28  0.01  0.01  0.26  0.01  0.01  0.26  0.01  0.01 
inv_gov(-1)  0.32  0.08  0.09  0.36  0.09  0.10  0.24  0.05  0.06  0.27  0.06  0.07 
inv_price(-1)  0.33  0.00  0.04  0.33  0.01  0.04  0.32  0.00  0.03  0.33  0.00  0.04 
edu(-1)  0.41  0.17  0.19  0.36  0.14  0.17  0.39  0.15  0.17  0.46  0.20  0.21 
infrastr(-1)  0.50  0.70  1.45  0.36  0.04  0.54  0.73  1.35  1.80  0.68  1.31  2.08 
Notes: PC11: based on principal components using energy consumption (World Bank), PC12: based on principal components 
using energy production (World Bank), PC13: based on principal components using electricity generation (IEA), PC14: based on 
principal components using total electricity generating capacity (IEA). 
inclusion probability is the posterior inclusion probability, mean is the posterior mean conditional on inclusion, s.e. is the posterior 
standard error conditional on inclusion. Bold figures for the posterior inclusion probability indicate that a given variable passes the 
prior inclusion probability of 1/2.. 
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Table A.9. Full model averaging, 2
nd principal component, 
linearity, full sample 
PANEL A: 5-year averages 
 




mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e. 
capita(-1)  0.96  -4.44  2.94  0.99  -4.57  2.83  0.91  -3.76  3.65  0.94  -3.94  3.36 
life_exp(-1)  0.25  0.06  0.06  0.35  0.09  0.08  0.32  0.08  0.08  0.32  0.08  0.08 
cpi(-1)  0.11  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.00  0.00 
reg(-1)  0.35  -0.17  0.15  0.29  -0.13  0.12  0.55  -0.33  0.24  0.52  -0.31  0.24 
d_lf(-1)  0.09  0.02  0.05  0.09  0.01  0.04  0.10  0.02  0.05  0.10  0.02  0.05 
open(-1)  1.00  0.10  0.02  1.00  0.10  0.02  1.00  0.09  0.02  1.00  0.09  0.02 
inv_gov(-1)  0.12  -0.01  0.02  0.12  -0.01  0.02  0.13  -0.01  0.03  0.13  -0.01  0.03 
inv_price(-1)  0.87  -0.04  0.03  0.92  -0.05  0.03  0.93  -0.05  0.03  0.92  -0.05  0.03 
edu(-1)  0.42  0.21  0.19  0.41  0.21  0.19  0.47  0.26  0.22  0.47  0.25  0.21 
infrastr(-1)  1.00  0.50  1.13  1.00  0.35  0.28  1.00  -0.38  0.93  1.00  -0.22  0.94 
PANEL B: 8-year averages 
 




mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e. 
capita(-1)  1.00  -8.62  1.62  1.00  -7.33  2.68  1.00  -7.82  2.20  1.00  -7.83  2.11 
life_exp(-1)  0.20  0.03  0.04  0.59  0.18  0.11  0.42  0.10  0.08  0.38  0.09  0.07 
cpi(-1)  0.25  0.00  0.01  0.42  0.00  0.02  0.35  0.00  0.01  0.33  0.00  0.01 
reg(-1)  0.15  0.02  0.03  0.13  -0.01  0.03  0.11  0.00  0.02  0.12  0.01  0.03 
d_lf(-1)  0.18  -0.06  0.11  0.12  -0.01  0.07  0.13  -0.02  0.07  0.13  -0.03  0.08 
open(-1)  0.96  0.05  0.02  0.79  0.04  0.02  0.87  0.04  0.02  0.84  0.04  0.02 
inv_gov(-1)  0.57  -0.12  0.07  0.49  -0.12  0.08  0.52  -0.12  0.07  0.54  -0.12  0.08 
inv_price(-1)  0.31  -0.01  0.01  0.64  -0.03  0.02  0.48  -0.02  0.01  0.45  -0.02  0.01 
edu(-1)  1.00  0.91  0.28  1.00  0.92  0.28  1.00  0.92  0.28  1.00  0.94  0.28 
infrastr(-1)  1.00  1.69  0.61  1.00  0.15  0.34  1.00  0.96  0.68  1.00  0.96  0.59 
PANEL C: 10-year averages 
 




mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e.  Incl. 
prob. 
mean  s.e. 
10-year  averages 
life_exp(-1)  0.36  0.08  0.09  1.00  0.68  0.19  0.99  0.51  0.18  0.99  0.43  0.17 
cpi(-1)  0.26  -0.01  0.02  0.88  -0.10  0.04  0.91  -0.09  0.04  0.88  -0.07  0.04 
reg(-1)  0.14  -0.01  0.04  0.68  -0.38  0.29  0.15  -0.02  0.05  0.13  0.01  0.04 
d_lf(-1)  0.42  -0.35  0.51  0.25  0.20  0.42  0.16  0.06  0.17  0.13  0.01  0.11 
open(-1)  1.00  0.11  0.03  0.33  0.01  0.01  0.72  0.04  0.03  0.85  0.04  0.03 
inv_gov(-1)  0.17  -0.01  0.03  0.25  0.05  0.07  0.13  0.00  0.02  0.13  0.00  0.02 
inv_price(-1)  0.20  0.01  0.02  0.30  0.01  0.04  0.35  0.02  0.04  0.36  0.01  0.04 
edu(-1)  0.36  0.11  0.12  0.23  0.06  0.10  0.14  0.01  0.04  0.24  0.05  0.07 
infrastr(-1)  1.00  5.73  1.12  0.72  0.44  0.37  1.00  2.91  1.19  1.00  3.07  0.83 
Notes: PC21: based on principal components using energy consumption (World Bank), PC22: based on principal components 
using energy production (World Bank), PC23: based on principal components using electricity generation (IEA), PC24: based on 
principal components using total electricity generating capacity (IEA). 
inclusion probability is the posterior inclusion probability, mean is the posterior mean conditional on inclusion, s.e. is the posterior 
standard error conditional on inclusion. Bold figures for the posterior inclusion probability indicate that a given variable passes the 
prior inclusion probability of 1/2.  
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Table A.10. Fixed effect OLS and GMM estimations,  
5-year averages 
 
Fixed effect OLS 
  1
st principal component 
  PC11  PC12  PC13  PC14 
  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value 
Cappp  -5.41  0.00  -5.94  0.00  -5.03  0.00  -5.29  0.00 
life_exp  0.29  0.14  0.30  0.12  0.30  0.11  0.30  0.12 
cpi  0.01  0.22  0.00  0.27  0.01  0.19  0.01  0.21 
reg  -0.53  0.02  -0.43  0.05  -0.59  0.01  -0.56  0.01 
dpop1564  0.57  0.15  0.48  0.20  0.61  0.12  0.60  0.14 
opengs  0.10  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.10  0.00 
ig_gdp  0.06  0.70  0.07  0.64  0.06  0.69  0.06  0.69 
i_price  -0.06  0.10  -0.06  0.10  -0.06  0.09  -0.06  0.09 
edu2  0.46  0.03  0.43  0.05  0.47  0.02  0.46  0.03 
infrastr  -1.72  0.06  -1.58  0.04  -1.91  0.03  -1.87  0.04 
  2
nd principal component 
  PC21  PC22  PC23  PC24 
  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value 
Cappp  -5.80  0.00  -6.20  0.00  -5.47  0.00  -5.53  0.00 
life_exp  0.25  0.24  0.23  0.28  0.26  0.21  0.27  0.18 
cpi  0.01  0.28  0.01  0.28  0.01  0.23  0.01  0.22 
reg  -0.51  0.03  -0.43  0.07  -0.61  0.01  -0.64  0.01 
dpop1564  0.36  0.35  0.31  0.42  0.38  0.34  0.40  0.30 
opengs  0.09  0.00  0.09  0.00  0.09  0.00  0.09  0.00 
ig_gdp  0.04  0.81  0.04  0.80  0.04  0.79  0.05  0.77 
i_price  -0.06  0.13  -0.06  0.11  -0.06  0.11  -0.06  0.11 
edu2  0.51  0.03  0.49  0.04  0.53  0.02  0.53  0.02 
infrastr  -0.35  0.65  0.12  0.60  -0.86  0.23  -0.87  0.18 
First difference GMM 
  1
st principal component 
  PC11  PC12  PC13  PC14 
  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value 
cappp  -5.76  0.00  -6.34  0.00  -5.52  0.00  -5.71  0.00 
life_exp  0.30  0.13  0.33  0.12  0.33  0.11  0.32  0.11 
cpi  0.01  0.21  0.00  0.28  0.01  0.18  0.01  0.21 
reg  -0.58  0.01  -0.45  0.03  -0.65  0.00  -0.62  0.00 
dpop1564  0.57  0.12  0.48  0.19  0.59  0.10  0.59  0.11 
opengs  0.12  0.00  0.11  0.00  0.12  0.00  0.12  0.00 
ig_gdp  0.10  0.52  0.11  0.48  0.11  0.44  0.10  0.48 
i_price  -0.06  0.08  -0.06  0.08  -0.06  0.08  -0.06  0.08 
edu2  0.58  0.02  0.52  0.03  0.60  0.02  0.58  0.02 
infrastr  -2.22  0.03  -1.90  0.04  -2.37  0.01  -2.32  0.02 
Sargan  0.54     0.49     0.61     0.57 
    2
nd principal component 
  PC21  PC22  PC23  PC24 
  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value 
cappp  -6.67  0.00  -6.77  0.00  -5.82  0.00  -6.07  0.00 
life_exp  0.27  0.21  0.28  0.23  0.25  0.26  0.28  0.20 
cpi  0.00  0.38  0.00  0.30  0.01  0.22  0.01  0.24 
reg  -0.46  0.03  -0.44  0.03  -0.57  0.01  -0.58  0.02 
dpop1564  0.35  0.37  0.37  0.31  0.39  0.29  0.40  0.27 
opengs  0.10  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.09  0.00  0.10  0.00 
ig_gdp  0.10  0.54  0.11  0.54  0.07  0.65  0.09  0.57 
i_price  -0.06  0.14  -0.05  0.11  -0.06  0.10  -0.06  0.11 
edu2  0.68  0.00  0.68  0.00  0.72  0.00  0.69  0.00 
infrastr  -0.08  0.93  -0.01  0.99  -0.71  0.30  -0.63  0.37 
Sargan  0.44     0.43     0.44     0.45 
  Notes: PC11: based on principal components using energy consumption (World Bank), PC12: based on principal components using energy 
production (World Bank), PC13: based on principal components using electricity generation (IEA), PC14: based on principal components using 
total electricity generating capacity (IEA). PC21: based on principal components using energy consumption (World Bank), PC22: based on 
principal components using energy production (World Bank), PC23: based on principal components using electricity generation (IEA), PC24: 
based on principal components using total electricity generating capacity (IEA). P-values are shown for the Arellano, Sargan and Hansen tests.   50 
Table A.11. The nonlinear relationship between growth and infrastructure 
(1
st principal component) 
PANEL A: 8-year averages 
 
PC11  PC12 
 








Capita  -7.258  ***  -7.287  ***  -3.574  ***  -7.310  ***  -7.171  ***  -4.835  *** 
life_exp  0.193    0.091    0.393    0.211    0.162    1.172   
opengs  0.037    0.027    0.954    0.040    0.030    1.137   
ig_gdp  -0.163    -0.258  *  -1.692  *  -0.149    -0.222    -1.323   
i_price  -0.032  ***  -0.026  ***  -3.099  ***  -0.032  ***  -0.032  ***  -2.861  *** 











     
Low  -0.152    0.904    -0.247    -0.411    0.433    -0.295   
High/mid 
 
  0.027    -1.506   
 









  0.004   
t1 
 
  0.320    0.32   
 









  0.735   




    0.136    0.294   
 
PC13  PC14 
 








Capita  -7.391  ***  -7.307  ***  -3.706  ***  -7.309  ***  -6.612  ***  -3.704  *** 
life_exp  0.182    0.270    1.540    0.188    0.348  **  2.242  ** 
opengs  0.037    0.033    1.006    0.037    0.046  *  1.781  * 
ig_gdp  -0.167    -0.118    -1.017    -0.165    -0.014    -0.064   
i_price  -0.032  ***  -0.032  ***  -3.155  ***  -0.032  ***  -0.038  ***  -3.038  *** 











     
Low  0.105    -0.728    0.328    -0.031    -3.578    -1.184   
High/mid 
 
  -0.087    1.384   
 









  -1.296   
t1 
 
  0.285    0.325   
 









  0.685   




    0.035    0.216   
PANEL A: 10-year averages 
 
PC11  PC12 
 








Capita  -10.766  ***  -7.155  **  -2.498  **  -10.294  ***  -10.590  ***  -5.331  *** 
life_exp  0.597  ***  0.599  ***  3.743  ***  0.608  ***  0.659  ***  3.977  *** 
opengs  -0.089  ***  -0.109  ***  -8.131  ***  -0.094  ***  -0.094  ***  -7.220  *** 
ig_gdp  -0.565  *  -0.269    -0.908    -0.590  *  -0.610  **  -2.132  ** 











     
Low  0.904    -3.876    -1.251    -0.488    -1.302    -0.456   
High/mid 
 
  -0.099    -1.277   
 









  -0.276   
t1 
 
  0.425    0.425   
 









  0.745   




    0.01    0.640   
 
PC13  PC14 
 








Capita  -11.068  ***  -8.977  ***  -4.849  ***  -10.932  ***  -9.316  ***  -4.773  *** 
life_exp  0.581  ***  0.620  ***  4.013  ***  0.591  ***  0.599  ***  3.997  *** 
opengs  -0.086  ***  -0.088  ***  -5.044  ***  -0.087  ***  -0.112  ***  -8.130  *** 
ig_gdp  -0.484  *  -0.448    -1.472    -0.524  *  -0.501  *  -1.586   






















     
Low  1.483    -0.711    0.101    1.361    -2.825    -0.972   
High/mid 
 
  0.875    2.028   
 









  0.933   
t1 
 
  0.305    0.310   
 









  0.745   






0.016    0.879   
Notes: low, high/mid, high are the lower regimes, the upper regimes (2-regime model)/the middle-regime (3-regime model), and the upper regime 
for the 3-regime model. T1 and t2 are the two thresholds. PC11: based on principal components using energy consumption (World Bank), PC12: 
based on principal components using energy production (World Bank), PC13: based on principal components using electricity generation (IEA), 
PC14: based on principal components using total electricity generating capacity (IEA).    
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Table A.12. The nonlinear relationship between growth and infrastructure 
(2
nd principal component) 
PANEL A: 8-year averages 
 
PC21  PC22 
 








Capita  -8.584  ***  -8.983  ***  -5.713  ***  -7.583  ***  -8.399  ***  -4.098  *** 
life_exp  0.060    -0.152    -0.893    0.192    0.164    0.805   
opengs  0.046  *  0.046  **  1.912  *  0.038    0.036    1.374   
ig_gdp  -0.178    -0.369  ***  -2.984  ***  -0.154    -0.162    -1.211   
i_price  -0.021  *  -0.023  **  -1.962  *  -0.031  ***  -0.031  ***  -2.608  ** 











     
Low  1.376  **  2.770  ***  2.437  **  0.140    0.892    1.321   
High/mid 
 
  1.578  ***  0.960   
 









  0.228   
t1 
 
  0.255    0.250   
 









  0.730   




    0.209 
 
0.549   
 
PC23  PC24 
 








Capita  -8.055  ***  -8.688  ***  -4.852  ***  -8.066  ***  -9.152  ***  -5.343  *** 
life_exp  0.142    -0.093    -0.389    0.131    -0.037    -0.115   
opengs  0.040    0.038    1.570    0.039    0.027    1.035   
ig_gdp  -0.156    -0.342  **  -2.368  **  -0.157    -0.298  **  -2.545  ** 
i_price  -0.026  **  -0.027  **  -2.610  **  -0.025  **  -0.026  **  -2.488  ** 











     
Low  0.770    2.831  **  1.724  *  0.747    2.470  ***  2.176  ** 
High/mid 
 
  1.365  **  1.011   
 









  1.209  ** 
t1 
 
  0.265    0.260   
 









  0.57   








0.504   
PANEL A: 10-year averages 
 
PC21  PC22 
 








Capita  -12.730  ***  -11.263  ***  -5.654  ***  -10.793  ***  -11.852  ***  -5.701  *** 
life_exp  0.275    0.410  *  2.255  **  0.590  ***  0.434  ***  3.155  *** 
opengs  -0.033    -0.041    -1.701    -0.090  ***  -0.063  ***  -2.823  *** 
ig_gdp  -0.148    -0.108    -0.392    -0.422    -0.210    -1.243   











     
Low  4.380  **  2.230    1.119    0.588    3.459  **  1.912  * 
High/mid 
 
  4.004  **  4.129  *** 
 









  0.678  *** 
t1 
 
  0.405    0.405   
 









  0.340   
p-value (bootstrap)    0.026    0.452 
 
    0.051    0.008   
 
PC23  PC24 
 








Capita  -11.554  ***  -12.259  ***  -5.719  ***  -11.583  ***  -12.408  ***  -6.289  *** 
life_exp  0.454  ***  0.439  ***  3.342  ***  0.401  ***  0.384  ***  2.505  ** 
opengs  -0.070  ***  -0.067  ***  -4.111  ***  -0.055  ***  -0.048  **  -2.267  ** 
ig_gdp  -0.108    -0.232    -0.670    0.082    0.019    -0.064   











     
Low  2.823  **  3.718  ***  1.804  *  3.201  ***  3.925  ***  2.123  ** 
High/mid 
 
  2.765  **  1.644   
 









  3.267  *** 
t1 
 
  0.255    0.430   
 









  0.640   
p-value (bootstrap)    0.048    0.116        0.186    0.768   
Notes: low, high/mid, high are the lower regimes, the upper regimes (2-regime model)/the middle-regime (3-regime model), and the upper regime 
for the 3-regime model. T1 and t2 are the two thresholds. PC21: based on principal components using energy consumption (World Bank), PC22: 
based on principal components using energy production (World Bank), PC23: based on principal components using electricity generation (IEA), 
PC24: based on principal components using total electricity generating capacity (IEA).   52 
Table A.13. Results of model averaging – nonlinearity of the infrastructure variable  
(1
st principal component) – 8 year averages 
  Inclus. 
Prob. 
mean  s.e  Inclus. 
Prob. 
mean  s.e  Inclus. 
Prob. 
mean  s.e  Inclus. 
Prob. 
mean  s.e. 
Cappp  1.000  -6.750  1.993  1.000  -6.150  1.273  1.000  -7.412  2.286  1.000  -6.241  2.534 
life_exp  0.488  0.166  0.095  0.045  0.012  0.010  0.464  0.200  0.111  0.687  0.229  0.112 
Cpi  0.404  0.009  0.017  0.424  -0.003  0.012  0.447  -0.005  0.011  0.533  0.044  0.038 
Reg  0.112  0.000  0.021  0.140  -0.006  0.029  0.140  -0.019  0.028  0.111  -0.004  0.021 
dpop1564  0.123  -0.010  0.062  0.163  -0.046  0.080  0.103  -0.003  0.061  0.110  -0.001  0.056 
Opengs  0.596  0.025  0.016  0.215  0.007  0.006  0.317  0.012  0.009  0.837  0.041  0.022 
ig_gdp  0.546  -0.186  0.094  0.966  -0.359  0.117  0.564  -0.194  0.093  0.298  -0.071  0.055 
i_price  0.642  -0.037  0.021  0.626  -0.027  0.015  0.454  -0.018  0.012  0.788  -0.081  0.044 
edu2  1.000  0.975  0.260  0.998  0.913  0.288  0.953  0.870  0.309  0.997  0.993  0.254 
Infrastr  Pc11  Pc12  Pc13  Pc14 
Linear  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.032  -0.013  0.055  0.145  0.024  0.261  0.001  0.000  0.002 
2-regime 
                           lower regime  0.636  0.363  1.416  0.966  1.116  0.941  0.809  0.539  1.577  0.996  -2.709  22.868 
   higher regime    0.110  1.157 
 
-0.147  1.715 
 
0.245  1.231 
 
-0.554  3.428 
3-regime 
                           low regime  0.363  -1.224  5.619  0.002  -0.002  0.007  0.045  0.008  0.174  0.003  -0.006  0.022 
   middle regime    -0.403  1.221 
 
0.002  0.005 
 
-0.033  0.089 
 
-0.004  0.007 
   high regime    0.094  1.232 
 
-0.006  0.008 
 
0.068  0.173 
 
0.002  0.016 
Notes: PC11: based on principal components using energy consumption (World Bank), PC12: based on principal components using energy 
production (World Bank), PC13: based on principal components using electricity generation (IEA), PC14: based on principal components using 
total electricity generating capacity (IEA). 
 
Table A.14. Results of model averaging – nonlinearity of the infrastructure variable  
(2
nd principal component) – 8 year averages 
  Inclusion 
probability 
mean  s.e.  Inclusion 
probability 
mean  s.e.  Inclusion 
probability 
mean  s.e.  Inclusion 
probability 
mean  s.e. 
cappp  1.000  -9.480  1.350  1.000  -7.463  2.255  1.000  -8.947  1.589  1.000  -9.337  1.481 
life_exp  0.231  -0.042  0.049  0.356  0.105  0.075  0.112  -0.008  0.024  0.116  -0.001  0.022 
cpi  0.448  -0.010  0.008  0.348  0.002  0.013  0.441  -0.009  0.009  0.473  -0.011  0.008 
reg  0.119  -0.011  0.024  0.106  -0.011  0.022  0.124  -0.015  0.028  0.105  -0.003  0.023 
dpop1564  0.183  -0.064  0.101  0.219  -0.072  0.138  0.104  -0.007  0.047  0.153  -0.042  0.084 
opengs  0.935  0.041  0.020  0.812  0.041  0.022  0.705  0.026  0.017  0.375  0.010  0.009 
ig_gdp  0.979  -0.308  0.108  0.382  -0.096  0.063  0.986  -0.317  0.110  0.975  -0.317  0.110 
i_price  0.405  -0.008  0.009  0.439  -0.022  0.015  0.472  -0.013  0.010  0.453  -0.011  0.009 
edu2  1.000  0.853  0.239  0.994  0.941  0.297  0.998  0.834  0.254  1.000  0.892  0.246 
infrastr  Pc21  Pc22  Pc23  Pc24 
linear  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.586  0.085  0.241  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000 
2-regime 
                           lower regime  1.000  2.633  4.501  0.412  0.643  0.557  0.998  2.705  3.750  1.000  2.596  4.088 
   higher regime    1.524  1.511 
 
0.119  0.168 
 
1.312  1.111 
 
1.236  1.041 
3-regime 
                           low regime  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   middle regime    0.000  0.000 
 
0.000  0.000 
 
0.000  0.000 
 
0.000  0.000 
   high regime    0.000  0.000 
 
0.000  0.000 
 
0.000  0.000 
 
0.000  0.000 
Notes: PC21: based on principal components using energy consumption (World Bank), PC22: based on principal components using energy 
production (World Bank), PC23: based on principal components using electricity generation (IEA), PC24: based on principal components using 
total electricity generating capacity (IEA). 
    
  53 
Table A.15. Results of model averaging – nonlinearity of the infrastructure variable 
 (1
st principal component) – 10-year averages 
  Inclus. 
Prob. 
mean  s.e  Inclus. 
Prob. 
mean  s.e  Inclus. 
Prob. 
mean  s.e  Inclus. 
Prob. 
mean  s.e. 
cappp  0.956  -5.337  4.277  1.000  -11.358  6.505  1.000  -10.609  2.359  1.000  -7.848  3.666 
life_exp  0.955  0.481  0.175  0.986  0.652  0.165  1.000  0.698  0.201  0.854  0.370  0.163 
cpi  0.255  0.001  0.021  0.757  -0.072  0.014  0.811  -0.091  0.023  0.456  0.055  0.041 
reg  0.963  -0.687  0.253  0.715  -0.552  0.350  0.999  -0.998  0.352  1.000  -0.990  0.179 
dpop1564  0.285  0.187  0.300  0.052  0.017  0.067  0.249  0.234  0.338  0.233  0.112  0.169 
opengs  1.000  0.097  0.021  0.596  0.025  0.018  0.829  0.060  0.028  1.000  0.125  0.024 
ig_gdp  0.997  0.608  0.164  0.688  0.251  0.185  0.994  0.482  0.206  1.000  0.537  0.135 
i_price  0.933  -0.176  0.039  0.285  -0.032  0.013  0.276  -0.030  0.020  0.999  -0.240  0.060 
edu2  1.000  0.913  0.385  0.728  0.441  0.449  0.998  0.748  0.372  0.999  0.654  0.387 
infrastr  Pc11  Pc12  Pc13  Pc14 
linear  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.004  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
2-regime 
                           lower regime  0.000  -0.001  0.001  0.063  -0.079  0.173  0.011  -0.013  0.049  0.001  -0.008  0.007 
   higher regime    0.000  0.000 
 
0.028  0.201 
 
0.009  0.038 
 
0.000  0.004 
3-regime 
                           low regime  1.000  -12.035  226.455  0.929  -3.227  22.627  0.989  -3.556  30.319  0.999  -8.647  121.087 
   middle regime    -0.278  4.218 
 
1.706  1.860 
 
0.817  1.735 
 
0.622  1.858 
   high regime    -6.462  83.365 
 
-4.534  41.751 
 
-1.226  7.814 
 
-1.826  12.581 
Notes: PC11: based on principal components using energy consumption (World Bank), PC12: based on principal components using energy 
production (World Bank), PC13: based on principal components using electricity generation (IEA), PC14: based on principal components using 
total electricity generating capacity (IEA). 
 
Table A.16. results of model averaging – nonlinearity of the infrastructure variable  
(2
nd principal component) – 10-year averages 
  Inclusion 
probability 
mean  s.e.  Inclusion 
probability 
mean  s.e.  Inclusion 
probability 
mean  s.e.  Inclusion 
probability 
mean  s.e. 
cappp  1.000  -12.357  3.057  1.000  -17.769  2.125  1.000  -13.805  3.238  1.000  -13.074  2.574 
life_exp  0.990  0.502  0.263  1.000  1.298  0.226  0.998  0.626  0.183  0.973  0.474  0.198 
cpi  0.868  -0.111  0.080  1.000  -0.443  0.074  0.972  -0.117  0.055  0.916  -0.083  0.050 
reg  0.139  -0.008  0.031  0.999  -0.980  0.272  0.266  -0.093  0.131  0.128  -0.006  0.043 
dpop1564  0.176  -0.034  0.165  0.988  1.672  0.687  0.152  0.091  0.209  0.195  0.101  0.248 
opengs  0.956  0.063  0.034  0.999  0.063  0.022  0.120  0.005  0.005  0.366  0.019  0.012 
ig_gdp  0.142  -0.009  0.026  0.998  0.423  0.163  0.225  0.011  0.045  0.158  -0.004  0.028 
i_price  0.684  0.093  0.091  1.000  0.440  0.085  0.411  0.051  0.054  0.426  0.042  0.047 
edu2  0.208  0.039  0.068  0.999  0.743  0.313  0.125  0.023  0.039  0.405  0.108  0.113 
infrastr  Pc21  Pc22  Pc23  Pc24 
linear  0.002  0.013  0.004  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.022  0.066  0.054  0.095  0.294  0.181 
2-regime 
                           lower regime  0.996  2.764  2.845  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.043  0.164  0.135  0.898  3.585  8.343 
   higher regime    4.567  12.354 
 
0.000  0.000 
 
0.115  0.124 
 
2.910  5.477 
3-regime 
                           low regime  0.002  0.002  0.009  1.000  3.462  6.032  0.935  3.775  5.737  0.007  0.027  0.020 
   middle regime    0.004  0.007 
 
0.354  0.248 
 
2.375  2.946 
 
0.021  0.012 
   high regime    0.000  0.009 
 
6.647  28.199 
 
1.254  1.429 
 
0.016  0.026 
Notes: PC21: based on principal components  using energy consumption (World Bank), PC22: based on principal components using energy 
production (World Bank), PC23: based on principal components using electricity generation (IEA), PC24: based on principal components using 
total electricity generating capacity (IEA). 
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Figure A.1.. Distribution of inclusion probability, 1










































































Figure 1B. Distribution of posterior mean conditional on inclusion, 1










































































(with electricity generation capacity)
 
Note: The distribution of the inclusion probability shows the distribution of the models (full sample + subsamples excluding one 
country at a time) in terms of inclusion probabilities. The vertical axis shows the number of models for which the values of the 
inclusion probability are shown on the horizontal axis are estimated. 
Note:  The  distribution  of  the  posterior  mean  conditional  on  inclusion  shows  the  distribution  of  the  models  (full  sample  + 
subsamples excluding one country at a time) in terms of the estimated means on variants of the principal component. The vertical 
axis shows the number of models for which the values of the estimated mean are shown on the horizontal axis are estimated.    
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Figure A.2. Distribution of inclusion probability, 2











































































energy and telecommunication component
(with electricity generation capacity)
 
 
Figure 2B. Distribution of posterior mean conditional on inclusion, 2















































































Note: The distribution of the inclusion probability shows the distribution of the models (full sample + subsamples excluding one 
country at a time) in terms of inclusion probabilities. The vertical axis shows the number of models for which the values of the 
inclusion probability are shown on the horizontal axis are estimated. 
Note:  The  distribution  of  the  posterior  mean  conditional  on  inclusion  shows  the  distribution  of  the  models  (full  sample  + 
subsamples excluding one country at a time) in terms of the estimated means on variants of the principal component. The vertical 
axis shows the number of models for which the values of the estimated mean are shown on the horizontal axis are estimated. CESifo Working Paper Series 
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